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ABSTRACT 
 
The reasons of the political, economical and ideological transformation in Mount 
Lebanon which began in the 19th century cannot be explained without taking into 
consideration the changes in the Ottoman centre. Although the 1858 Lebanese Civil 
War is seen as a breaking point in the political history of the Mountain, in essence it is 
only a byproduct of the political developments emerged in the region throughout the 
19th century. 
The occupation of Mount Lebanon by the governor of Egypt Muhmammad Ali 
Pasha constituted the real beginning point of all the political transformation process in 
Mount Lebanon. Muhammad Ali Pasha and his son Ibrahim Pasha had certain 
centralization attempts during their reign in the Mountain. However this situation 
caused the emergence and the rise of tension between Druzes and Maronites. This social 
tension even could not be moderated by the reform attempts of the Sublime Porte and 
by the Double Qaimaqamate system established by the center. 
The Mutasarrifiyat regime in the Mountain which established in 1861 
immediately after the end of the Civil War increased the autonomy of the Mountain and 
in addition to this it ended the feudal structure of the region. The emergence of the 
Ottomanist policies as the ideology of the Porte‟s centralization attempts caused the 
emergence of certain reactions in the Mountain. 
This study will try to explain the political and the ideological transformation in 
Mount Lebanon during the Hamidian era in context of the centralization and 
Ottomanism policies of the Sublime Porte. 
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ÖZET 
19. yüzyıl‟da Cebel‟i Lübnan‟da meydana gelen siyasal, ekonomik ve ideolojik 
dönüşüm, Osmanlı Devleti‟nin merkezinde yer alan gelişmeler göz önüne alınmadan 
açıklanamaz. Her ne kadar 1858 İç Savaşı Cebel-i Lübnan‟ın siyasal tarihinde bir 
dönüm noktası olarak görülse de, esasında bu savaş 19. yüzyıl boyunca bölgede 
meydana gelen siyasal gelişmelerin bir yan ürünüdür. 
Cebel‟i Lübnan‟ın Mısır valisi Mehmed Ali Paşa tarafından işgali bölgedeki 
siyasal dönüşümün esas başlangıç noktasını oluşturur. Cebel‟deki saltanatları boyunca 
Mehmed Ali Paşa ve oğlu İbrahim Paşa‟nın bazı merkezileşme denemeleri olmuştur.  
Fakat bu durum Dürzi ve Maruni mezhepler arasında bir gerilimin oluşmasına ve 
yükselmesine sebep olmuştur. Bu sosyal gerilim Bab-ı Ali‟nin reform politikaları ve 
merkez tarafında kurulan Çifte Kaymakamlık sistemi ile dahi yatıştırılamamıştır. 
1861 yılında İç Savaş‟ın sona ermesinden hemen sonra kurulan Mutasarrıflık 
rejimi Cebel‟in özerkliğini arttırmış ve bölgedeki feodal düzeni sona erdirmiştir. Bab-ı 
Ali‟nin merkezileştirme çabalarının ideolojisi olarak ortaya çıkan Osmanlıcılık, 
Cebel‟de bazı tepkilerin doğmasına yol açmıştır.  
Bu çalışma Abdülhamid dönemi boyunca Cebel-i Lübnan‟daki siyasal ve 
ideolojik dönüşümleri merkezileşme ve Osmanlıcılık poitikaları bağlamında açıklamaya 
çalışacaktır. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this study is examining the effects of the Ottomanist and the centralist 
policies of the Sublime Porte on one of the important peripheral regions of the Empire, 
Mount Lebanon, during the Mutasarrifiyat era. The study mainly covers the 1858 
Lebanese Civil War and the Mutasarrifiyat regime between the years of 1861 and 1892. 
My curiosity about the relations of the Ottoman center particularly with its Arabic 
periphery increased after my research about Ahmed Pasha al-Jazzar and his governance 
in Acre. Although he was loyal to the center and he was not openly protesting orders of 
the Ottoman state, he was also able to take his own decisions in locality and he turned 
into a powerful local figure during his reign. After this research, I decided to focus on 
Syria geography and I furthered my readings about the region. 
At the end of my readings, I noticed that the ethnic composition of Mount 
Lebanon and its long-lasting feudal structure is quite interesting. The interesting point 
about the ethnic composition of Mount Lebanon was that in addition to the existence of 
division between Greek, Arabic, Jewish and Armenian groups based on their religious 
beliefs, there was also a division among Arabic population as Christian and Muslim 
Arabs. Maronites were Arabic people who had Christian belief and they were living in 
Mount Lebanon. The Druzes‟ had a heterodox Islamic belief. Although this different 
groups succeeded to live together in stability until the 19
th
 century under the rule of 
Ottoman Empire, in the 19
th
 century this ongoing stability came to an end. 
Before beginning the writing process of this thesis, the studies of Leila Fawaz and 
Ussama Makdisi became my inspiration to do a research about the social and 
ideological transformation of Mount Lebanon.  In his well-known study which is named 
“The Culture of Secterianism: Community, History and Violence in the Nineteenth-
Century Ottoman Lebanon”, Makdisi explains all the developments within the context 
of sectarianism
1
. When it comes to Leila Fawaz,, in her study which is named “An 
Occasion for War: Civil Conflict in Lebanon and Damascus in 1860”, her main 
argument is that from 1861 to 1914 people of Mount Lebanon lived in peace and 
harmony as it had been for most of its history and in this perspective she sees the Civil 
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 Ussama Makdisi, “The Culture of Secterianism: Community, History and 
Violence in the Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Lebanon”, (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 2000)p.166. 
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War of 1858 as a particular exception between the years of 1840 and 1860. In addition 
to this, she prefers to explain the reasons of the Civil War via the conflicts between the 
local rulers and the peasants and also via foreign interventions rather than sectarianism
2
. 
This thesis aims to bring a new perception that is different from these two 
important studies. The common point in the studies of Makdisi and Fawaz is that both 
prefer to examine the Mount Lebanon independently from the Ottoman centre. The 
point that is missing in the studies of these two important scholars is that they do not 
examine the political and ideological changes of the Mountain in relationship with the 
Sublime Porte. It should not be forgotten that until 1920, Mount Lebanon was a part of 
the Ottoman territory. In this context, the important study of Engin Akarlı which is 
named “The Long Peace: Ottoman Lebanon 1861-1920” breaks two existing prejudices 
about the Ottoman and Lebanese history. First of all, he refers to the era between 1861 
and 1920 as an era where the stability could be provided by the Sublime Porte in Mount 
Lebanon. With this emphasis, he falsifies the existing decline paradigm about the 19
th
 
century of Ottoman Empire. By many historians, the 19
th
 century referred as the era 
when Ottoman Empire was losing all its power and also it was losing control on its 
territories. However, Akarlı shows us that in this era, the Ottoman state showed an 
important success in providing a stable system in Mount Lebanon. Secondly, during his 
study Akarlı shows that all the administrative and social changes of Mount Lebanon 
cannot be understood without taking into consideration the developments in the 
Ottoman centre. Because of these two crucial reasons, Engin Akarlı‟s study became my 
main inspiration to do a research about the Civil War and Mutasarrifiyat experiences of 
the Mountain. 
In order to understand the political and social transformations of the late-19
th
 
century‟s Mount Lebanon, in the first chapter which is titled as “A General Look at the 
pre-1858 Ottoman Lebanon” the social and political structure of the Mountain in pre-
1851 era will be examined. Firstly the boundaries of Mount Lebanon in the earlier ages 
including the pre-Ottoman conquest era will be defined and the effect of the region‟s 
territorial relation to Syria on the political history of the Mountain will be defined. Also, 
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 Leila Fawaz; “An Occassion for War: Civil Conflict in Lebanon and 
Damascus in 1860”, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994).47-78, 
218. 
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the population issue which constitutes a crucial place in Mount Lebanon‟s history will 
be evaluated. As it is well-known, Mount Lebanon had a heterogeneous ethnic 
composition beginning with the ancient times and this situation proceeded during the 
Ottoman rule. Having brief information about the population of the Mountain will be 
helpful for examining the issue of when and how the two main ethnic and religious 
groups of the region, Maronites and Druzes, begin to feed a mutual hatred against each 
other. Another crucial issue of the first chapter will be the history of Mount Lebanon‟s 
political and administrative organization. After the Middle East conquest of Selim I in 
1516 the region including Syria and Mount Lebanon came under the Ottoman rule. 
Before the Ottoman rule, both Syria and Mount Lebanon enjoyed a local feudal system. 
The administration of all the former Mamluk territories in Syria as one province came 
to an end as a result of the revolt of Janbirdi al-Ghazali in 1520-1521. So, the feudal 
structure of Mount Lebanon goes back to the Mamluk rule in the region. After the 
conquest, Selim I confirmed the already existing feudal order. The first chapter will try 
to discuss the reasons and effects of this continuation of the feudal system in the 
Mountain both on the local politics and also on the Sublime Porte‟s politics in a general 
sense. 
The most crucial issue of the first chapter will be the discussions of the Egyptian 
Interregnum and the effects of the Tanzimat policies in the region. The Egyptian 
Interregnum will be used for defining the era which begins after the conquest of Syria 
and Mount Lebanon in 1831 by Muhammad Ali Pasha who was the governor of Egypt 
by then and his son Ibrahim Pasha. The first question about the era that is defined as 
Egyptian Interregnum is that how did the Egytpian rule influence the local political 
structure of Mount Lebanon? Because of the scarcity of economic sources, Mount 
Lebanon depended on neighboring Syrian provinces and it was divided into two 
administrative regions. According to this, the north of the Mountain was under the 
jurisdiction of the governor headquartered in Tripoli and the south was under the 
governor headquartered either in Acre or Sidon. Beginning with the governor Ahmad 
Pasha al-Jazzar‟s era, Acre had an economic and political importance for the local rulers 
and this made Mount Lebanon another crucial region due to its crucial place particularly 
in terms of establishing economic relations with the important trade centers. Egyptian 
occupation began in Acre in 1831 and it lasted over Syria and Mount Lebanon between 
the years of 1831 and 1840. When it comes to the effects of the Egyptian interregnum 
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on Mount Lebanon, according to Dick Douwes, Egyptian rule in Syria and also in the 
Mountain can be considered as a clear, if not a radical departure from the preceding 
Ottoman administrative tradition
3
. One of the important questions that needs to be 
discussed about the Egyptian occupation era is that how did the political arrangements 
of Ibrahim Pasha in the region influence the relationship between the Druze and 
Maronite sects? This issue will be covered in details in this chapter. 
The Tanzimat era which includes reformation movements related with the re-
centralization attempts of the Sublime Porte had its repercussions on the peripheral 
regions of the Empire. The case of Mount Lebanon constitutes a good example to 
examine this issue. The first rescript of the Tanzimat era aimed to take both the Muslim 
and non-Muslim populations of the Empire into consideration and emphasizes that the 
Sultan will let both his Muslim and non-Muslim subjects to benefit from his 
benevolence without any discrimination. The first rescript of the Tanzimat era different 
from the second one, Islahat Rescript, was not bringing radical changes in political 
sense. It was only aiming certain regulations on administration and it was providing a 
written guarantee to already existing rules in the Empire. Also the Imperial Edict of 
Gülhane emphasized that the Sultan provides his benevolence to all his subjects without 
any discrimination. In this way the Sublime Porte tried to be more inclusive in order 
realize the centralization policies. In Mount Lebanon, the Tanzimat declaration together 
with the arrival of France and Great Britian to the region spelled the end of the emirate 
system. However, the question of Tanzimat reforms reached to its aim or not and what 
kind of social and political affects it had on the region, are crucial questions that need to 
be discuss in this chapter. 
In the second chapter which is titled as “Lebanese Civil War, European 
Intervention and the Reglement Organique”, I will try to evaluate the political changes 
after 1841. The way that the end of the Egyptian occupation affected the region will be 
discussed in details. The end of the Egyptian occupation in Mount Lebanon in 1841 
caused the emergence of the Double Qaimaqamate system and this new administrative 
structure began with the appointment of Ömer Pasha in 1842 and it lasted until 1858. 
One of the important questions about this era is that did the Double Qaimaqamate 
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(London; New York: I.B. Tauris, 2000), p. 191 
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system made any changes on the political and social arrangements of the previous 
Egyptian rule in the Mountain. Druze population in the Mountain had certain 
discontents about the political regulations of Ibrahim Pasha‟s regime. However, the 
success of Double Qaimaqamate regime about providing happiness and social stability 
to the people of the Mountain is a crucial issue that will be examined in details in this 
chapter.   
1858 Civil War created a breaking point in the political and social history of 
Mount Lebanon. It caused the death of so many people particularly among the Maronite 
and also among the Druze people in the region. This study aims to bring a different 
perspective to the reasons of 1858 Lebanese Civil War and the Mutasarrifiyat regime 
which established by the Sublime Porte after the end of the war. This study questions 
the reasons led to the emergence of the Civil War in a wider perspective. It argues that 
examining the process led to the Civil War only with the issues of sectarianism and the 
struggle between the peasants and local rulers is not enough. The issue of Civil War and 
the Mutasarrifiyat regime should be examined with reference to the Sublime Porte since 
the region was an Ottoman territory during these years.  
The Mutasarrifiyat regime in Mount Lebanon constitutes the main focus in the 
second part of this study.  Different from the secondary sources which I have mentioned 
before, this study will not be restricted only with the social and administrative 
arrangements of the new regime; the Mutasarrifiyat era will be examined in relation to 
the centralist policies of the Sublime Porte. Different from the existing researches about 
the field, this study will try to find answers to the questions such as what was the role of 
the Sublime Porte and the European powers in the establishment and the preservation of 
the Mutasarrifiyat system and how did the local people and particularly the local 
notables who had the political and social control previously react to this new system? 
Could the Mutasarrifiyat regime help the Ottoman government to realize the centralist 
and Ottomanist policies? These questions will be tried to be covered during the second 
chapter. 
On the third chapter, which will be titled as “The Mutasarrifs of Mount Lebanon” 
the articles of the Reglement Organique‟s which were written in the Salname-i Cebel-i 
Lübnan belonging to the year of 1305/1887-1888 will be mentioned and both 
administrative and political changes came together with the Mutasarrifiyat regime will 
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be discussed. In addition to this, in the same chapter, the context of the center-periphery 
relations will be the main focus point and the relations of the mutasarrifs to the center 
and the issue of how to define Mount Lebanon as an Ottoman “territory” will be 
discussed. Since the aim of this topic is trying to examine the Mutasarrifiyat experience 
during Abdulhamid II‟s era, the centralization policies of the first four mutasarrifs of 
Mount Lebanon, who were Davud Pasha (r.1861-68), Franko Pasha (r.1868-1873), 
Rüstem Pasha (1873-1883) and Vasa Pasha (1883-1892) will be the focus point and the 
similarities and the differences between their policies and the relations with the Sublime 
Porte will be examined comparatively. The reason for restricting this study with these 
four names is that after 1892 the centralist policies of the Hamidian era enters to a new 
phase and in this new era it would not be possible to think the appointment of an 
Ottoman bureaucrat who was an Armenian in his ethnic origin as the mutasarrif of 
Mount Lebanon. Related with this radical break after 1892, this research will be 
restricted with the first four mutasarrifs of Mount Lebanon. 
The fourth chapter which is titled as “Reactions to the Centralist Policies: 
Ottomanism versus Lebanonism” will begin with questioning the emergence and the 
development of the idea of Ottomanism. The reason for focusing on these two 
ideologies is that all the political transformation in Mount Lebanon cannot be clearly 
understood without examining the ideological transformation. When we talk about the 
centralist policies of the Sublime Porte, it is not possible to examine this issue clearly 
without understanding the ideological background. Also in case of Mount Lebanon, all 
the centralist policies and the establishment of the Mutasarrifiyat as a new 
administrative system caused the emergence of certain reactions. Those reactions also 
had an ideological background too, which was Lebanonism. In this context, the 
questions of this chapter will be such as what kind of an ideology was the Ottomanisn in 
its nature and is it possible to talk about an idea of Ottomanism as a homogenous 
ideology? These questions will constitute the basic context of the arguments during this 
chapter and the important ideologues of the Ottomanist ideology such as Namık Kemal 
and Ziya Bey will be mentioned.  
The second part of the fourth chapter will try to deal with the issue of Lebanonism 
and its relations to the Ottomanist ideology. In this study, both the Arabism and 
Lebanonism will be considered as the separatist movements that emerged as a reaction 
to the centralist discourse of the Ottomanism. At the beginning, the relation between 
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Arabism and Lebanonism will be discussed, the common points and the differences 
between these two ideologies will tried to be shown but after that, since both ideologies 
can be considered as “separatist” movements; both Lebanonism and Arabism will be 
used interchangeably relying on their similarity in this context.  
The primary sources of this study are Salnames of the Hamidian era, archival 
documents and newspapers. Salname-i Cebel-i Lübnan belonging to the years of 
1305/1887-1888, 1306/1888-1889 and 1307/1889-1990 will be used effectively to 
evaluate the articles of the Reglement Organique and also to examine the transformation 
of the ethnic composition and the integration of the local powers into the new system 
during the Mutasarrifiyat era. During this study, a problematic point with the Salname-i 
Cebel-i Lübnan is recognized. These salnames are the documents which were submitted 
to Sultan Abdulhamid. When the articles of Reglement Organique in Salnames and the 
original version of the Reglement existing in another primary source belonging to 
Nouradoughian are compared, certain differences between two versions is noticed. 
However, since one of the aims of this study is focusing on the Mutasarrifiyyat 
experience during the Hamidian era, this issue will not be mentioned in this study. In 
addition to this, since the only available versions in the Turkish libraries are these three 
salnames, only the data of these years are used in discussions about the population and 
the administration issues during the Mutasarrifyat regime.  
The archival documents, especially the ones belonging to the Yıldız Evrak Odası 
constitute the basic primary source of this study. In the Ottomanism and Lebanonism 
chapter, the newspapers were planned to be used as the primary sources. It was possible 
to reach the newspapers belonging to Young Ottomans which were named as Muhbir, 
Hürriyet but unfortunately it was not the same for the Beirut, which published by the 
Lebanonist Arabs. Even though it was written as available in Hakkı Tarık Us, in the 
library it was told that there are no available versions of the newspaper. For this reason, 
Beirut could not be used in this study. 
Secondary sources about the Ottoman Lebanon and the issue of Ottomanism 
constitute the backbone of this study. As I have previously mentioned, the studies of 
Ussama Makdisi and Leila Fawaz which have different perspectives about the causes of 
1858 Lebanese Civil War, will be used comparatively. The data provided from these 
sources will also be bolstered with the chronicles belonging to names such as Colonel 
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Churchill and Ahmed Cevdet Pasha. Chronicle of Colonel Churchill on Mount 
Lebanon‟s history and 1858 Civil War is open to discussion about its objectivity but 
still it is an important source since it was written by an eye-witness of the era. Colonel 
Churchill was married to the daughter of one of the notable Druze families of the 
Mountain and at the beginning he was one of the supporters of the Druze cause during 
the Civil War. Later on, he claims that he could not stand to witness all these violence 
that Maronites faced and decided to write his memoir
4
. In addition to this fact, certain 
overlapping between Churchill‟s memoire and Fawaz‟s study made his chronicle one of 
the main sources for this thesis, particularly in the chapter which discusses 1858 Civil 
War.  
Engin Akarlı‟s well-known study which is named “The Long Peace” will be used 
as the main source to bolster the arguments which were derived from the primary 
sources. In addition to this, studies of Thomas Philipp, A.L. Tibawi, Ceasar Farah, 
Moshe Maoz, Kamal Salibi will be benefited quite effectively.  
In the last chapter, about the issue of Ottomanism, Akşin Somel‟s and Şerif 
Mardin‟s studies will be used as the main sources. Somel‟s perspective on the 
Ottomanism and his methodology will be used excessively in this study for defining the 
Ottomanism as one of the most popular ideologies of the 19
th
 century Ottoman Empire. 
Şerif Mardin‟s well-known study which is named “Yeni Osmanlı Düşüncesinin 
Doğuşu” provides answers to the questions about how this new ideology was 
considered by the Ottoman intellectuals of the era. 
As it was said before, this study will try to bring an alternative perspective to the 
existing literature about the 1858 Lebanese Civil War and Mutasarrifiyat experience. In 
order to do, it will be emphasized that when all these events were happening, Mount 
Lebanon was a part of the Ottoman territory. Since it is not possible to ignore the 
emergence of ideological transformation in parallel with the political events, both 
Ottomanist and Lebanonist ideologies will be examined in this context.  
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2. CHAPTER I 
A GENERAL LOOK AT THE PRE-1861 OTTOMAN LEBANON 
2.1. Definition of Geography 
It is important to evaluate and explain the geographic characteristics of Mount 
Lebanon by taking into consideration Syria as a whole due to the impossibility to 
understand its geography in isolation from Syria. 
The whole Syrian land includes the huge land mass extending from Cilicia to the 
“Holy Land”5. Jacques Eddé gives a general picture of Syria and Lebanon by indicating 
kazas and vilayets of these two geographies. According to that, in administrative sense 
Syria was divided into three main vilayets and they were also subdivided into sandjaks 
and kazas. These three vilayets were Aleppo, Beirut and Syria or Damascus. The vilayet 
of Aleppo was divided into three sandjaks which were Aleppo, Maraş and Urfa. The 
vilayet of Beirut was divided into five sandjaks as Beirut, Tripoli, Acre, Nablus and 
Latakia. Lastly the vilayet of Damascus was divided into four sandjaks which were 
Damascus, Hawran, Hama and Maan. In addition to these three sandjaks, there were two 
müstakil sandjaks which were Deir-Zor, Jerusalem and these two sandjaks could be able 
to enjoy independence more compare to others. These sandjaks where directly 
responsible to Dahiliye Nezareti and Lebanon was an autonomous sandjak.  
This general administrative picture provided by Jacques Eddé belongs to the era 
between the years of 1914-1918 and it also started to be applied after 1888. However 
Lebanon acquired its particular status after a long historical process which took place 
during the 19
th
 century. Though Lebanon became autonomous and later on fully 
independent from Syria, the division of sandjaks described by Eddé is quite ancient. As 
Selim I conquered Syria, he did not attempt to change the existing administrative order 
and geographical divisions. As Bruce Masters mentioned in his article, Syria was 
effectively divided into four separate provinces which were Damascus, Aleppo, Tripoli 
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and Sidon
6
. Even in 1800, these four provinces continued to exist with ill-defined 
boundaries. 
When it comes to the geography of Lebanon specifically, the region is named as 
“Mount Lebanon” especially after the 19th century. The reason for using the attribute of 
“Mount” to this geography is that, it was the name of the northern ridges of mountains 
and the hills extending along the Mediterranean coast from the Barid River in the north 
to the Zahrani River in the south. The region was covered by the mountain range which 
is called as “Lebanon Mountains” today. As the special administrative regime which 
was named mutasarrifiyat established in Lebanon in 1861, the region started to be called 
as “Mount Lebanon” or simply “The Mountain”7. 
Mount Lebanon has distinctive topographical features as Engin Akarlı mentioned 
in his book.  Accordingly Mount Lebanon rises from a very thin coastal strip and 
reaches imposing heights within 25-33 kilometers of the coast, and falls to the plains of 
Ba‟lbak and Biqa on the east8. Geographical features of the mountain separates and from 
time to time isolates Lebanon from the world around it, such as certain Mediterranean 
cities and trade centers along the coast, but also causes internal division; especially in 
social sense. For this reason it is crucial to say that, geographical features of Lebanon 
have had important effects on the social order of this former Ottoman province. 
There has been also a connection between the geographical features and 
communication issue as I have just mentioned. As Akarlı states in his study, before the 
advent of the technology, the tortuous terrain of the Mountain limited the travel and 
transportation between the sub regions and neighboring lowland settlements
9
. As a result 
of these difficulties, economic activities remained limited in scope. This caused Lebanon 
to remain dependent on two neighboring Syrian provinces, Tripoli and Saida since 1516. 
On the other hand, the central location of the port of Beirut helped it to trade 
commodities from distant lands via Saida and Tripoli.   
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2.2. Ethnic Groups and Population 
Mount Lebanon has been known for its multi-ethnic and multi-cultural features. Its 
historical roots go back to pre-Ottoman eras and we can even say that it grounds to 
ancient times. However, this multi-ethnic characteristic of the Mountain became the 
main reason of political developments and social conflicts in the 19
th
 century Ottoman 
Levant. 
Two significant ethnic groups of Mount Lebanon have been the Druzes and the 
Maronites. However, there were other people from different ethnic and religious 
backgrounds which included Armenians, Greek Catholics, Greek Orthodox, Shiites and 
Jews. According to results of the population census of the Ottoman state which was 
realized in the years of 1877 and 1878, the overall population was 110.000 in Mount 
Lebanon and 120.000 in Beirut. The total number of households was 18.000 in the 
Mountain and 12.375 in Beirut
10
. In 1881-1882-1883 population census we see the total 
number of population in Mount Lebanon as 100.000
11
. 
Historically Maronites were the major religious group. Maronites were the 
descendants of an Arab, or Arabized Christian people whom the Byzantines drove out of 
the Orontes valley onto the highlands of Mount Lebanon in the late tenth century
12
. The 
story of Maronites‟ itinerary to the Mountain is related to the historical division within 
Christianity. Due to the discussions on the human or divine nature of Christ, the 
churches of Rome and Constantinople split in 1054 and the Eastern Orthodox Church 
followed Constantinople, supporting the existence of both human and divine natures of 
Christ
13
. In seventh century, The Monothelete doctrine supported that Christ possessed 
both a divine and human nature but having only one divine will and they were 
condemned as heretics by the Council of Constantinople. However, this Monothelite 
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doctrine survived among Maronites
14
. Long before the first missionaries arrived to the 
Mountain, Christians had been living in the region, and Maronites settled in Mount 
Lebanon during the tenth and eleventh centuries following persecutions by the 
Byzantines because of the existing religious disagreements
15
. It is also important to note 
that, until the late thirteenth century, the majority of not only Lebanon‟s population but 
also generally Syria‟s population was Christian and mainly Eastern Orthodox16. 
Specifically in Mount Lebanon, during 1860s almost 60% of the Mountain‟s population 
consisted of Maronites
17
. 
The second important and dominant religious belief in Lebanon and in Syria was 
Islam. After the Arab conquest of Syria in the seventh century; Islam began to spread all 
over the geography. Because of different reasons, ideological divisions also occurred 
within Muslims as it has been among Christian people. One of the sides of this 
ideological confrontation were the Sunnis, or Orthodox Muslims, who believe that the 
leadership of Islam had passed from the prophet Muhammad to the first four caliphs, 
rightly guided successor chosen by acclamation, then to Umayyad caliphs
18
. Sunnis 
consider caliphs as the temporary rulers and see the Quran, as well as the Prophetic 
Tradition, as the real source of the Islamic belief. However, in the first century of Islam, 
a controversy emerged over the succession to Prophet, leading to the formation of a 
group named as Shi‟is, which means “partisans”19. According to Shiites, the prophet‟s 
successors should belong to the family of prophet‟s cousin and also son-in-law Ali. 
Because of the high importance given to the successors, a belief of a holy line of imams 
emerged which ended with the lost twelfth imam. The Fatimid Caliphate in Egypt (909-
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1171) was the first major Shiite state in the Middle East. It also played a role in the 
emergence of the Druze sect. One of the Fatimid caliphs of Egypt, Hakim, declared 
himself as the reincarnation of God and spread this doctrine among the rural inhabitants 
of the Shuf Mountains in southern Lebanon and of Wadi Taym in Anti-Lebanon
20
. The 
Druze sect in Lebanon came into being through this way. According to Akarlı, religious 
beliefs of Druzes can be seen as a combination of Helenistic, Iranian and other pre-
Islamic religious traditions
21
. This caused problems for the relations between the Sunni 
state and the rather heterodox Druzes. 
In addition to these two dominant groups, there were Armenian, Jewish, Greek 
Orthodox and Greek Catholic populations. According to Akarlı, Greek Orthodox 
elements were the urban elements of the region, like the Sunnis, and they were generally 
living around Saida and Tripoli.  
2.3. Political Organisation 
The region of Syria came under the authority of the Ottoman Empire in 1516 by 
the conquest of Selim I. The administration of all the former Mamluk territories in Syria 
as one province came to an end as a result of the revolt of Janbirdi al-Ghazali in 1520-
1521
22
. Before the Ottoman rule in the region, Syria and Lebanon enjoyed some kind of 
a feudal system in both political and economic senses. 
According to Tibawi, after the conquest Selim I confirmed the already existing 
feudal order
23
.  It means that, the region did not become totally connected to the 
Ottoman centre even at the sixteenth century and the sultan was content with the 
acknowledgement of his authority by powerful local families. The Ottoman centre 
delegated their authority of collecting taxes in an organized manner and providing peace 
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and security in the region to the local rulers due to the existing tensions between 
different sects. About the same issue, Bruce Masters indicates that there can be little 
doubt that the Porte‟s primary expectations from its governors, especially from the ones 
in critical provinces such as Tripoli and Sidon was the control of the various religiously 
heterodox and often rebellious people of Syria‟s coastal mountains who were Alawis, 
Druzes and Maronites
24
.  
This attitude of the Ottoman center towards the region gave to Syria and Mount 
Lebanon quite autonomous characteristics compared to other peripheral regions of the 
Empire and local families were very effective in the governance of their towns or 
regions. Even in the early modern era, the Ottoman centre provided certain privileges to 
Mount Lebanon which implied rule by a native prince, preferably a Christian, governing 
according to traditionally acceptable codes of Mount Lebanon, which were unwritten
25
. 
Between 1593 and 1633 we witness the long rule of Fakhr al‟Din but after 1642 this 
privileged status supported by the unwritten code of the Mountain was interpreted as to 
mean the rule of Shihab emirs in the region. Under Fakhr al‟Din‟s political authority; a 
group of chieftains had established themselves quite firmly as quasi-feudal tax collectors 
and administrators in the central and southern parts of the Mountain and the Wadi al-
Taim
26
. These chieftains were mostly Druze, but in different parts of the Mountain, in 
regions like Kisrawan, we witness the existence of influential families like the Maronite 
Khazins and Hubaishes. Power struggle between these local families continued for a 
long while and indeed shaped the political life of the region. However, it is important to 
say that, factors leading to these struggles in earlier centuries were related to issues of 
prestige and not related with religious beliefs or ethnic issues. As Ussama Makdisi 
indicates in his study, even in the same family it was possible to see family members 
belonging to different religious beliefs or sects. One of the most powerful families of the 
Mountain was Shihab family, and this family was divided into Christian and Sunni 
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branches. Makdisi properly claims that rank rather than religion was the all important 
marker of elite status in rural Mount Lebanon
27
. Different branches of this powerful 
family fought and competed with each other for the privilege to rule Mount Lebanon, 
not for the cause of “superiority” of their religious identity. 
The institution of grand emirate, which was usually occupied by a member of one 
of the powerful local families of the Mountain, constituted an important position in the 
local policy since the Mountain was quite autonomous from the center compared to the 
other provinces under the Ottoman rule. However, later on the grand emirate became a 
rather exploitative and economically oppressive institution
28
. Though the Grand Emir 
did not receive official salaries from the centre, he was totally free about collecting taxes 
from the people of the Mountain. Once he was elected, the Grand Emir would 
monopolize his political and economic hegemony over the region. For instance, the 
Shihab family who monopolized of the post since their elevation by the other local 
feudal families strove ruthlessly to maintain their political supremacy
29
. 
Another important point is that, in addition to Ottoman central state‟s policy, the 
geographic characteristics of Mount Lebanon also determined its degree of political 
autonomy. The mountainous characteristics of Lebanon ensured its isolated situation and 
weakened the effect of the state authority. In addition to their political hegemony, local 
families were also acting as the tax farmers of the region. The strengthening of local 
feudal actors and the accumulation of power in the hands of the Grand Emir caused even 
more the increase of the level of autonomy of the Mountain. In addition to the rise of 
local rulers, international developments also led the Ottoman centre to the application of 
certain centralisation policies. In order to understand the local political system and place 
of the Ottoman centre in this context and also the beginning of centralisation policies 
towards the peripheral regions of the empire, it is a prominent necessary to look at the 
political and economic administration system of Ottoman state and its progress. 
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2.4. Effects of the 18th Century Ottoman Administration on Mount Lebanon 
As many scholars of the field declared, 18
th
 century Ottoman Empire underwent a 
relative decentralisation process of especially in its peripheral regions. Inevitably this 
process had major effects on the periphery of Ottoman Empire. For an autonomous 
region like Lebanon, the political and economic transformation of the Ottoman center 
was of great importance in terms of understanding the political evolution of the 
Mountain 
Ottoman Empire was of course not isolated from the international developments 
and for this reason, the emergence of the “military revolution” in Europe in the 16th 
century affected Ottoman Empire both in political and economic senses. As Ottoman 
historians such as Halil İnalcık and Suraiya Faroqhi indicate, the last two decades of the 
sixteenth century were a period of financial, political, economic and demographic 
difficulties for the Ottoman Empire
30
. Between the years of 1584 and 1586 there was the 
dramatic devaluation of the akçe and this devaluation had an important political 
repercussions like janissary revolt in 1589
31
.Depending on the introduction of new 
tactics in the European armies and development of new army organizations, Ottoman 
Empire began to lose its relatively military superiority over European states which 
existed in pre-sixteenth century era. In addition to the external military developments, 
Ottoman rulers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries engaged in a series of long 
wars like the ones on the Iranian and Habsburg frontiers
32
. Existing Ottoman military 
system could not provide military success to the state. As Ariel Salzmann mentioned in 
her article about the political economy of the eighteenth century Ottoman Empire; as a 
consequence of the demands of the new forms of warfare, Ottoman fiscal practices 
shifted dramatically
33
. During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the center decided to 
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convert agrarian taxes to lum-sum cash payments which is known as maqtu in Ottoman. 
This new economical policy was a result of the extensive usage of money in the 
Ottoman economy especially after 15
th
 century. The state used the muqataa and the 
iltizam system to collect some of revenues in cash in order to pay salaries and meet other 
expenditures
34
. These taxes were paid by villagers and town quarters to people who were 
appointed by the centre based on the three years contracts
35
. These appointed multazims 
were generally chosen among the bureaucratic elites such as viziers, pashas. This 
method was named as iltizam and the contracts were signed for a short period of time 
and the centre aimed restricting the possible growth of these local elites. 
In the seventeenth century, due to deterioration of already existing fiscal problems, 
short term taxing which could be seen as a way of internal borrowing system was in a 
state of crisis. The reasons behind this situation were the worsening of the conditions in 
many rural areas over the seventeenth century both in Middle Eastern provinces and 
Balkans, as well as the emergence of revolts and social upheavals such as the Jelali 
revolts. Between 1683 and 1699, following the Second Siege of Vienna, Ottomans 
became confronted with a major enemy known as the Holy Alliance, which resulted in 
critical defeats. As a result of all these reasons, the Ottoman state was forced to 
introduce a new form of tax collection system named malikane-i divani in 1695.  
Malikane system was a contract on state revenues which gave the tax collector 
rights to collect taxes on the basis of established rates from the time of the award until 
the contractor‟s death36. At first glance, malikane system can be seen as an economic 
privilege which was given to the local rulers. Because of this “economic privatization”, 
eighteenth century Ottoman Empire has been defined as an era of decentralisation. In 
traditional history writing it used to be seen as the “era of decline”. However, according 
to scholars such as Ariel Salzmann and Dina Rizk Khoury, the decline paradigm lost 
almost all of its plausibility. They convincingly argue that even if the eighteenth century 
can be defined as the era of the decentralisation policies, as it has been in many Middle 
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Eastern provinces like Mosul and Acre; it did not prevented the Ottomanization of all 
these regions
37
. Salzman states that, the decentralisation of fiscal agency encouraged the 
development of parallel institutions that channeled and contained competition and 
conflict between and among state and non-state elites
38
.  For the peripheral provinces, 
this means that rather than the total disappearance of the central authority in provinces, 
the malikane system provided emergence of parallel institutions supporting and trying to 
protect the existence of political control of the Ottoman state over its peripheral 
territories.  
In the case of Syrian geography, I believe that fiscal transformation of Ottoman 
state strengthened the hand of the local rulers.  As Salzmann indicates, they provided the 
emergence of parallel institutions representing central authority. However, through the 
economic power that they have procured thanks to the malikane system, they also were 
able to create their own political authority spheres. Although they seemed obedient to 
the central state, they made independent decisions in many cases. 
Therefore, the muqataa policy of the Ottoman center did not provide a strong 
political authority of the center over Lebanon. As Akarlı explains in his study, in the 
Mountain the tax-farming evolved in a rather peculiar way, and the so-called muqataajis 
or in other words “tax farmers” were able to establish themselves more firmly and 
autonomously than their colleagues elsewhere
39
. The malikane system only strengthened 
the quasi-feudal structure of the mountain and the muqataajis even possessed the 
support of the peasants who were working in their lands and also living under their 
political authority.  
 In terms of Syria and Lebanon, it is also possible to say that both Ahmed Pasha 
al-Jazzar (the butcher) at the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth 
century and Muhammad Ali Pasha and his son İbrahim Pasha constituted other 
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significant examples for the level of autonomy that these Ottoman pashas were able to 
achieve in their localities. 
Ahmed Pasha al-Jazzar, was born in the late 1730s in Bosnia and into 
impoverished circumstances
40
. From the day he was appointed as the governor of Sidon 
in 1776 and he remained in his position until his death in 1804. His itinerary for his 
career started in Egypt as a member of the household governor of Egypt Ali Pasha in 
1756 and he worked in the citadel
41
. In 1770 he came to Deir al-Qamar in Lebanon as a 
poor man and the Druze Amir Yusuf took an interest in him and fed him
42
.  After he 
stayed in Deir al-Qamar for a while, he went to Damascus to collect some valuable and 
money. After a while, when the Russian fleet emerged in Mediterranean as a 
consequence of the Russo-Ottoman war of 1768 - 1774, Amir Yusuf asked the governor 
of Damascus, „Uthman Bey, to send him Ahmed and some troops in order to defend the 
region. In here Ahmed Pasha proved his military capabilities and skills
43
.  It can be said 
that, the career journey of this young adventurer reached to a successful peak point in 
1776 as he became appointed as the governor of Sidon following the execution of Zahir 
al-„Umar by the Ottoman state.  
As an ambitious local governor, Ahmed Pasha continuously searched for the ways 
to widen his area of political influence and due to his past experiences in Deir al-Qamar, 
he had a foothold in the politics of the Mountain, especially among Druzes. This was 
something that his predecessor Zahir al-„Umar could never obtain. As an ambitious 
ruler, he played the game according to its rules, which means that he never directly 
opposed the orders of the centre, nor did not give up to act autonomously in many 
political and economic issues. For instance, the sudden occupation of Egypt by the 
Napoleon Bonaparte in 1798 became an opportunity for Ahmed Pasha al-Jazzar to prove 
his capabilities to Selim III. Ahmad Pasha al-Jazzar showed an enormous success in the 
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defense of Acre when he defeated the forces of Napoleon
44
. However, the same pasha 
did not hesitate to act against the will of Kapudan-ı Derya Cezayirli Hasan Kapudan 
Pasha because of his ambitions over Mount Lebanon. To establish his authority as the 
wali of Sidon over Mount Lebanon, al-Jazzar demanded from Amir Yusuf the payment 
of taxes from the Mount Lebanon area, taxes which the Kapudan Pasha had just 
collected in the name of Ottoman government
45
.  The example of Ahmed Pasha al-
Jazzar clearly shows us that those appointed pashas of peripheral provinces had the 
ability to create their own political control at the local level. 
When it comes to the policies of Ahmed Pasha al-Jazzar over Mount Lebanon, he 
knew how to exploit existing muqataa system in Mount Lebanon which had created a 
hierarchic network of feudal relations. Every muqataa was accepted as the domain of the 
muqataaji family, so it was even possible to divide these lands among other members of 
the family
46
. This situation caused certain conflicts among the different branches of the 
same family, or among different influential families. In order to realize his ambitions 
over Mount Lebanon, Ahmed Pasha played the rival factions of the competing families, 
especially Druzes, against one another. He also collected much higher sums from 
mountaineers than their normal tax burden
47
.  
The manipulations of Ahmed Pasha al-Jazzar could be successful from time to 
time, however conflicts and higher tax burdens continued to be a problem for muqataajis 
of the Mountain, even under Abdullah Pasha, who was successor of Ahmed Pasha al-
Jazzar and  the governor of Acre between 1818 and 1832. 
Apart from the role of muqataajis families and pashas appointed from the center to 
the region, the era of Muhammad Ali Pasha of Egypt and the subsequent Tanzimat 
reforms had critical effects on the political organization and the system of Mount 
Lebanon and also of Syria. 
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2.5. The Egyptian Interregnum 
Muhammad Ali Pasha was a particular example for showing the strengthening of 
local authorities and creating alternative power fields against the central government. 
The pattern of feudalism which emerged due to the special circumstances that I 
have already mentioned continued to remain in Mount Lebanon until 1830s. Due to the 
scarcity of economic sources, Mount Lebanon depended on neighboring Syrian 
provinces. For tax levying purposes, the Mountain was divided into two mu‟amalas48. 
The north was under the jurisdiction of the governor headquartered in Tripoli and the 
south was under that of the governor headquartered either in Acre or Sidon
49
. 
Until the occupation of Egypt in 1831 the region remained subjected to different 
levels of political and economic competition between the Grand Emirate, the governor 
of Sidon and the governor of Tripoli. Since 1804, Suleiman Pasha who succeeded 
Ahmed Pasha al-Jazzar in Sidon supported Bashir II who remained in power between 
1788 and 1840 as the Grand Emir of the Mountain following the war between the valis 
of Damascus and of Sidon, Suleiman Pasha, emerging victoriously, was rewarded with 
jurisdiction over the districts of Jubayl and Biqa
50. As „Abdullah Pasha succeeded 
Suleiman Pasha in 1819, problems started to emerged between him and the Grand Emir 
of the Mountain
51. Different from his predecessor, „Abdullah Pasha was less favorably 
disposed towards Bashir. As he became the vali of Sidon, he demanded a million of 
dirhams for financing the cost of his office. The economic demands of „Abdallah Pasha 
and his feud with the vali of Damascus became tenser as Bashir was reinstated as the 
grand emir after a short break. The reign of Amir Bashir as the grand emir is quite 
important because different from any of his predecessors except for Fakhr al-Din, Amir 
Bashir had become the focal point of the Mountain‟s political life52. Even Fakhr al-Din 
                                                          
48
 Caesar E. Farah, “The Politics of Interventionism in Mount Lebanon, 1830-
1861”, (London: Centre for Lebanese Studies, 2000),  p.2 
49
 Ibid. 2 
50
 Ibid.7. 
51
 Ibid.7. 
52
 Engin Akarlı, “The  Long Peace: Ottoman Lebanon 1861-1920”, (Berkeley: 
University of California Press), p.22. 
22 
 
was acting as the client of the governors and followed policies depended on them; 
however Amir Bashir was an ambitious political figure who searched for new ways to 
develop the Mountain‟s economy and tried to increase the amount of cash coming to 
Mount Lebanon. In addition to this, he also had centralisation attempts in the Mount 
Lebanon because rather than division of political power among different actors, Amir 
Bashir desired to monopolize all political power solemnly in his hands. For this reason, 
he looked for different alliance and tried to evaluate every single opportunity
53
. 
The conditions leading to Egyptian interregnum as a part of the political history of 
Mount Lebanon emerged as a consequence of the struggle between these three parties. 
The Damascus vali‟s mutasallim of Biqa attacked and robbed the flock of the town of 
„Amiq, which was under the jurisdiction of the vali of Sidon54. In words of Ceasar 
Farah, Vali Derviş Pasha of Damascus was ready to concede jurisdiction over the Biqa 
valley, which traditionally was under the valiship of Damascus
55
. However, rather than 
accepting this peaceful solution, „Abdullah Pasha insisted on Bashir retrieving these 
areas by force. Increasing tension between the local rulers of Southern Syria and the 
Mountain also had been heard from the centre; the Porte demanded Mustafa Pasha who 
was the vali of Aleppo during this period to go and help Derviş Pasha. Also a buyrultu 
was sent from Istanbul to the local people of Mount Lebanon which declared the 
deposition of Bashir as the grand emir.  
Amir Bashir and „Abdullah Pasha constituted two main obstacles on the way of 
regional hegemony of another ambitious local ruler, the governor of Egypt, Muhammad 
Ali Pasha. These two political figures prevented Muhammad Ali Pasha from entering 
Syria. As a powerful ruler who established his own central state in Egypt, Muhammad 
Ali Pasha wanted to expand his political power to Syria because of the economical ties 
between two regions. Above all this, another reason behind Muhammad Ali Pasha‟s 
ambitious politics was his grievance against Sultan Mahmud II who turned to a deaf ear 
                                                          
53
 Ibid. 22 
54
 Caesar E. Farah, “The Politics of Interventionism in Mount Lebanon, 1830-
1861”, (London: Centre for Lebanese Studies, 2000),  p 8. 
55
 Ibid,8. 
23 
 
to the pasha‟s repeated petitions to grant him the Syrian provinces56. Muhammad Ali 
Pasha previously assisted Mahmud II during the Greek War of Independence when the 
Sultan promised the Egyptian governor the provinces of Morea and Crete. When Greece 
became independent, Muhammad Ali Pasha demanded Syria as compensation. 
Eventually, Muhammad Ali Pasha decided to take by force what he could not possess by 
diplomacy. 
On 1 October 1831, Muhammad Ali‟s armies who were commanded by his son 
İbrahim Pasha, crossed the borders of the pashalık of Acre and on 11 November laid 
siege to the heavily fortified city of Acre that had once withstood the assaults of 
Napoleon Bonaparte, as I have formerly mentioned
57
. This attack of Muhammad Ali was 
successful and Acre fell in May 1832. Ibrahim Pasha quickly established his authority 
both in coastal and inland regions of Syria, then he advanced over Konya to Kütahya 
following a series of battles Though ding to march on Istanbul
58
, Muhammad Ali 
restrained this attempt of his son as a consequence of the Russian support of the 
Ottoman Empire in February 1833, when a Russian naval squadron entered the 
Bosphorous and anchored at Büyükdere. As a result of this development, Ibrahim Pasha 
was forced to enter into negotiation with the Ottomans and the Kütahya Treaty signed 
between two sides on 8 April 1833. This treaty legalized Muhammad Ali Pasha‟s hold 
on Syria
59
. Egyptian occupation over Syria and Lebanon lasted between the years of 
1831 and 1840.  
When it comes to the effects of the Egyptian interregnum on Lebanon, according 
to Dick Douwes, Egyptian rule in Syria is generally depicted as a clear, if not a radical 
departure from the preceding Ottoman administrative traditions
60
. As an answer to the 
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question of in which fields the Egyptian administration in Syria and Mount Lebanon 
realized this radical change firstly, it shifted the center of political administration from 
Acre to Damascus. This can be seen as a consequence of centralization policies of 
Ibrahim Pasha. As Moshe Maoz indicates in his study, the former division of country 
into pashalıks was abolished and all provinces of Syria and also Palestine were put 
under a civil governor-general, the Egyptian Sharif Pasha, who resided in Damascus and 
was represented in each district town by a mutesallim who was generally a local Arab
61
. 
Secondly, the Egyptians established in contrast to the traditional regime of the 
Ottoman system, a higher degree of control over finances
62
.  This means that, the new 
regime aimed to abolish the monopoly of multezims, who constituted an obstacle to a 
strong local and centralized authority, in tax collection. The new regime began to 
employ salaried tax collectors. 
When it comes to the issue of monopolizing political power, it is important to 
indicate that just like the Ottoman state, Muhammad Ali Pasha and his son tried to 
represent the role of a distinct household which claimed absolute power and, 
consequently, the disposal of the entire revenue of its domains. In the process of creation 
of a new hierarchical and strong authority by the Egyptian notables, they also tried to 
replace the Ottoman center in the role of providers of justice. Ottoman center tried to 
establish their understanding of ruling and justice around quite ancient perspective 
which was named as “Circle of Justice”. According to this idea, as the Ottoman scholar 
Hasan Kafi had defined in Usulü‟l Hikem fi Nizamı‟l Alem,  justice is specifically 
defined the ruler‟s personal benevolence towards the re‟aya, people who are ruled, 
whom he protects from excessive taxation and the oppression of the military elite
63
. In 
addition to this, the Kurdish scholar İdris-i Bitlisi considers justice with the virtues 
which the ruler has to possess and these are benevolence, devotion, fidelity and 
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beneficence
64
. In very general, the ruler should provide the happiness and well-being of 
tax-payers which is an essential duty of the ruler for providing justice. However, even 
the new Egyptian rulers tried to procure this understanding and applied it, they failed to 
be successful. 
According to Tibawi, the cause of discontent which emerged two years after the 
invasion which later would cost the Egyptians in men and treasure more than defeating 
Ottoman armies was Muhammad Ali‟s persistence in applying in Syria measures he had 
easily applied in Egypt
65
.  He applied heavy taxation, corveé and ordered the 
confiscation of the property and burning of the houses belonging to those Druzes who 
rejected to support Egyptians and defected to the Ottoman side. In addition, İbrahim 
Pasha introduced a new tax with his father‟s advice, which was named as al-fardah, and 
was a kind of income tax payable by all males of all communities between the ages of 
fifteen and sixty at the rate of 12 percent of the income
66
. This additional tax created a 
general unrest in society and prevented the new Egyptian rule to apply the circle of 
justice in a real sense.  
Druzes as a community felt huge discontent about the regime of Ibrahim Pasha. 
During the invasion, Druze community and notables did not support the action of the 
Egyptians in contrast to Maronites and Bashir Shihab. For this reason, after Muhammad 
Ali invaded Egypt, he broke the power of the muqata‟ajis and compelled recognition of 
non-Muslims in local government
67
. Ibrahim Pasha also abolished certain distinctions 
which had vexed Christian pilgrims while at the same time paying European consuls for 
more attention than they have ever received under Ottoman rule
68
. In addition to this, 
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Egyptian government also confiscated lands and properties belonging to Druze families 
and notables in order to punish them. 
This existing unrest of the Druzes turned into an uprising against the Egyptian 
rule. As Makdisi indicates; Muhammad Ali was aware of the existing threat and he 
urged Ibrahim Pasha to consider the possibility of using Maronite mountaineers against 
the Druzes
69
. So, Ibrahim Pasha decided to unarm Druzes and used Maronite community 
to suppress and prevent the Druze uprsing. 
All together, Egyptian Interregnum inevitably had certain important political and 
social consequences. Ibrahim Pasha created an alliance with Bashir Shihab and 
recognized him as the Grand Amir of Mount Lebanon. He settled Maronite peasants on 
confiscated lands of Druze people. Because of these reasons, many scholars accept the 
Egyptian interregnum as a breaking point in terms of the emergence of sectarian 
conflicts. More than this, the additional taxations, especially al-fardah, and the general 
conscription policies caused the emergence of a discontent toward the Egyptian regimes 
both among Maronite and Druze peasants, and this caused the emergence of a general 
uprising in the 1840 which will be mentioned in coming chapters. Furthermore, the 
Egyptian regime in Syria and the Mountain caused certain developments in the Porte too 
and this became one of the main motivations behind the Tanzimat era. 
2.6. Tanzimat Era and 1840 Crisis 
The first reforming edict of the Tanzimat era was the Hatt-ı Şerif Of Gülhane 
(Noble Rescript of the Rose Chamber), which was promulgated on 3 November 1839. 
Beside well known reasons, I assert that there were two specific reasons behind the 
process. One was the international issues and the other was the aim to gain the support 
of the European powers against the rebellious Pasha of Egypt, Muhammad Ali, who 
expanded his power over Syria and threatened the integrity of Empire
70
. 
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The year of 1839 was the time when Sultan Abdülmecid found himself under 
tremendous military pressure coming from İbrahim Pasha71. Before Abdülmecid 
acceded the throne, the Ottomans received another catastrophic defeat from the 
Egyptians on 23 June 1839 at Nizip. For this reason, an immediate need to strengthen 
the central authority emerged, combined with the need to assure the support of European 
diplomacy promulgated the Gülhane decree
72
.  
When it comes to the main objectives of the Noble Rescript, as Maoz indicates in 
his study, Mustafa Reşid Pasha‟s concerns for reforming the administration and 
government was in reality not the crux of this rescript
73
. Rather than this, the rescript 
appeared as a charter of rights for the Ottoman subject with the aim of taking both the 
Muslim and non-Muslim populations of the Empire into consideration.  
This year was the peak point of the existing social unrest both among Maronite 
and Druze communities towards İbrahim Pasha‟s and his supporter Amir Bashir‟s 
regime. This unrest was related especially about the issues of disarmament of the local 
people and compulsory conscription. Under such an atmosphere, reformation policy of 
the Porte had different effects. As Makdisi argues, the Ottoman state obviously did not 
take into account the demographic character of Mount Lebanon. To show his point, he 
asks a very important question: How was the equality of treatment of religious 
communities going to be reconciled with demographic majorities and minorities, 
especially after the Maronite Patriarch declared the Maronites to be the “majority” of the 
population?
74
 This attitude of Maronite Patriarch increased the tension which emerged 
especially with the era of Muhammed Ali between Druze and Maronie communities.  
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In Mount Lebanon, the arrival of France and Great Britian to the region and the 
declaration of the Tanzimat spelled the end of the emirate system. The Gülhane Rescript 
introduced a new principle of administrative equality between the empire‟s Muslim and 
non-Muslim populations and according to Fawaz, because of this the Muslims began to 
lose ground to non-Muslim population whom they began to perceive as “outsiders”75. 
The emphasis on the equality between the subjects belonging to different sects 
negatively affected the already existing tensions between Maronites and Druzes 
stemming from the discriminative politics of Ibrahim Pasha. More crucial than this, the 
Tanzimat stressed principles of “liberty” and “legitimacy” in the person of Sultan, who 
underlined just rule irrespective of religious creed
76
. In addition to this, the role of Sultan 
as the father figure he provides his benevolence to his entire subject without 
discrimination based on their religious beliefs indicated clearly in Gülhane Rescript. 
However, as I have already mentioned at the beginning, since the early ages, Mount 
Lebanon used to be a quite autonomous region where people had never felt the existence 
of the sultan in local politics.  Even if they would have accepted his authority, it was 
quite late for providing equality between the Muslim and non-Muslim subjects of the 
region since the Maronite Patriarch had already become politicized and declared the 
Maronites to be the biggest population of the Mountain
77
.  
In 1838 revolts broke out against the existing Egyptian regime. The revolt of 
Druze notables and Christian ahali first emerged in Dair al-Qamar. The reasons behind 
this revolt were the taxes and previous confiscation of lands belonging to Druze 
notables. As it happened, Druze people in exile also started to demand their confiscated 
properties. This was also the time when the Gülhane Rescript started to show its effect 
and both the British government and the Porte promised the returning back of the 
confiscated lands under the condition of obedience to the authority of the Sultan. 
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In 1840, Ottoman state succeeded to terminate the Egyptian interregnum in Syria 
through the help of ally powers. Ibrahim Pasha left the region and also Amir Bashir II 
left the Mountain with them. Instead Bashir III, Qasim (r. 1840-1842) appointed as the 
new Grand Amir. However, the withdrawal of Egyptian army from Egypt created a 
power vacuum in the region. A violent struggle emerged between the Maronite and 
Druze people. Efforts of elite groups following the violence of 1841 to re-inscribe strict 
political and social boundaries reached their climax in December 1842
78
.  
With the Tanzimat, Ottoman centre was in an effort to rule Mount Lebanon 
directly by appointing a governor. After the Bashir III was removed, the Porte appointed 
Ömer Pasha from İstanbul, but he could not stop the unrest in the Mountain79. As the 
new governor of Mount Lebanon, Ömer Pasha‟s main concern was strengthening the 
political control of the center. In order to succeed in his aim, the first thing he was 
supposed to do was to put an end to all thought of a Shihab restoration
80
. As he 
established himself in the palace of Bayt al-Din, he began to rally around him all those 
elements in the country who were already opposed to the Shihabs. He aimed to winning 
their support by showing them special favour. As a part of his agenda, he focused on the 
Druze feudal chiefs who had been dispossessed during the rule of Bashir II and Bashir 
III, Ömer Pasha gave back their old estates and reconfirmed in their traditional 
prerogatives
81
. He also appointed some of Druze notables as his advisers and agents.  
At the same time, Mount Lebanon had become internationalized. Existence of 
missionaries and the already well-developed relations of France with the Maronites and 
Britain with the Druzes contributed to this process. As Salibi indicates in his study, the 
special relations between the Maronites and France dated back to early Ottoman times; 
but it was only in 1841 that the Maronites began to seek advice and support exclusively 
from the French consuls, and that the Druzes began to look upon the French consulate in 
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Beirut with feelings of hostility
82
. The strengthening of relations between the Maronite 
community of the Mountain and French consulates was also a result of Ömer Pasha‟s 
policies which supported Druzes.  
The reason behind Ömer Pasha‟s failure in his aim of stopping the unrest in the 
Mountain was the decline of the Anglo- Druze support of Ömer Pasha. The Druze 
leaders began to feel that it was by their own efforts that the Shihabs had been 
overthrown and the regime of direct Ottoman administration established and they were 
therefore unwilling to receive dictation from the Turks
83
. As a result of this reaction of 
Druzes against his government, Ömer Pasha turned for support to the Maronites and he 
began to employ a number of them in his service as troops under their own leaders. This 
action of Ömer Pasha alienated the Druzes still further and by the time the petitions in 
praise of Ömer Pasha‟s administration were being circulated in the Mountain, especially 
among the Druzes. As a result of the emergence of this tension between the Druzes and 
Ömer Pasha, Britain was no longer bound to support the Pasha‟s position and she was 
now able to join the other European powers in protesting against the validity of the 
petitions
84
. 
In 1842 Ottoman foreign minister and the ambassadors of Great Powers came 
together in Istanbul to discuss about how to find a solution for filling the existing power 
vacuum and stop the conflict between Maronites and Druzes which emerged toward the 
end of Egyptian occupation. Different parties suggested different plans. To France the 
only proper solution for the Lebanese question was to restore the Emirate to the country, 
preferably with a Shihab as emir. Naturally, Ottoman state completely opposed to the 
French suggestion and instead, the Porte supported complete integration of the Mountain 
in the Ottoman Empire, the region would be administered directly by the Pasha of Sidon. 
Even though the Ottoman plan supported by Russia, both France and Britain opposed to 
this suggestion. The Austrian Chancellor Prince Metternich‟s plan was a sort of 
compromise between the French and Ottoman points of view and he proposed division 
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of the Mount Lebanon into two administrative districts
85
. As a result of this meeting, a 
new plan was introduced a new administration for the government of Mount Lebanon 
which was called the Double Qaimaqamate
86
. This new system took effect in 1843 and, 
with a revision in 1845; it remained in place until 1861. When it comes to its logic, it 
divided the mountain into two self-governing districts, each under a district governor 
named qaimaqam
87
. This division was determined according to the demographic weight 
of each of the ethnic groups in a specific region. For this reason the northern district was 
under the rule of a Maronite and the southern district was under the rule of a Druze. The 
qaimaqams were appointed directly by the Ottomans and these qaimaqams were 
accountable to the Ottoman governor in Sidon
88
.  
In theory, dividing the Mountain into two regions according to ethnic population 
seemed applicable to both the Ottoman centre and European powers. However, in 
practice the population of Lebanon was not divided homogenously into two distinct 
parts. For this reason it was inevitable to see Maronite peasants under the rule of Druze 
qaimaqam or the vice versa. In addition to this, the powers of the qaimaqams were 
restricted to their own districts, which created additional problems for the new system. 
In order to solve this issue, the Ottoman authorities decided to appoint one Christian and 
one Druze agent or wakil to exercise judicial and tax-collection taxes collection taxes on 
behalf of the landlords in the mixed south
89
. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
85
 Ibid.63. 
86
 Leila Fawaz, “An Occassion for War: Civil Conflict in Lebanon and 
Damascus in 1860”, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), p 27 
87
 Ibid. 27. 
88
 Ibid. 28. 
89
 Ibid. 29. 
32 
 
3. CHAPTER II 
LEBANESE CIVIL WAR, EUROPEAN INTERVENTION AND THE 
REGLEMENT ORGANIQUE 
The end of the Egyptian occupation in Mount Lebanon caused emergence of 
Double Qaimaqamate system as I have covered in the first chapter. Neither centralizing 
reforms of the Ottoman Empire via the Gülhane Rescript nor this new political system 
brought an end to the hostility between Druzes and Maronites which reached to a high 
level during the rule of Ibrahim Pasha. In order to understand the path that led to the 
emergence of the catastrophic civil strife which was tried to be solved by the 
mutasarrifiyat system, it is a necessity to look at the political changes and social effects 
of the policies followed after 1841. 
3.1. Political Change after 1841 
The Double Qaimaqamate system officially began with the appointment of Ömer 
Pasha in 1842 and lasted until 1858. As a governor of Mount Lebanon, Ömer Pasha‟s 
main concern was to put an end to all hopes for a Shihab restoration period
90
. It should 
be noted that the Maronite Church continued to remain loyal to the notion of a Shihabi 
emirate
91
.  After Bashir II was sent to exile, the Maronite community in particular 
wanted him back and they were not happy to see Bashir Qasim in his place. 
In order to make direct Ottoman rule of the Mountain applicable, Ömer Pasha 
tried to establish and strengthen his own authority in the region. At the beginning, he 
had the support of British Empire and Druze society. However, Ömer Pasha‟s short 
tenure between the years of 1841 and 1843 as governor came to an abrupt end and the 
Double Qaimaqamate did not work as it had been planned. The main reason behind the 
failure of the Double Qaimaqamate was that the elites of both Maronite and Druze 
communities were unhappy about the new system since one of the main aims of the new 
regime was the termination of the local feudal structure. Although rural elites were not 
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happy about the system and the partition decision of the Mountain into two districts, 
they however quickly adapted to the fait accompli of the partition. They still maintained 
their old-regime rank and titles and they were aware of the importance of their sectarian 
identity. They began to struggle for convincing both the Sublime Porte and European 
Powers about the justice of their cause as a coherent community which has the right to 
win the political and economic control of the majority of lands and also the mixed 
villages
92
. Secondly, even though the Ottoman state aimed at abolishing the feudal 
structure and preventing emergence of the new conflicts between the two religious 
communities within the new system, the division of the Mountain into two did not work 
as it had been planned by the European powers and the Porte. In theory, the northern 
district was supposed to be a homogenous “Christian” area ruled by a Christian district 
governor and the southern district was to be a “distinctively” Druze region ruled by a 
Druze district governor
93
. However, as Salibi states, from the very beginning the Double 
Qaimaqamate presented serious difficulties since it had been instituted on the false 
assumption that the Beirut-Damascus road divided the Mountain into two distinct and 
ethnically homogenous parts
94
. Both northern and southern districts were not as much 
homogenous as it was thought to be. Significant numbers of Druze and Maronite people 
were living on both sides. As Leila Fawaz indicates, although the European powers and 
the Porte created the Double Qaimaqamate system, neither Druzes nor the Maronites of 
the Mountain acted on the assumption that the region had been divided into two. As a 
result, the new administrative units created more problems than they solved because 
they did not correspond to the social realities of the nineteenth century Mount 
Lebanon
95
. Finally, the Druzes‟ expectations could not be met by this new system. Due 
to their problems and sufferings during the ten-year reign of İbrahim Pasha, Druzes 
were the ones who provoked and started the revolt against Egyptian rule in the whole 
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geography. Despite their successful struggle against İbrahim Pasha and his authority, 
especially Druze sheikhs claimed that their time-honored feudal superiority over the 
Christians was now denied by the Ottoman state and Ömer Pasha himself
96
.   
In order to understand better the discontent of Druze sheikhs, it is also important 
to look at the Ottoman state‟s policy over the region. With effect of the ideas about the 
political centralization, which was even more furthered by the Tanzimat ideology, the 
Porte and those Ottoman officials appointed administrators to the peripheral regions 
believed that reform and state authority should go hand in hand. Especially in the case 
of Mount Lebanon, according to the perspective of the center, public order and security 
could be guaranteed only by bringing local notables to heel and by removing their 
“stupid,silly and fickle” followers from the realm of politics97.  This understanding 
constituted the reason of the policy of the Porte for not returning the lands to the Druze 
notables who were their original owners which were previously confiscated by İbrahim 
Pasha. Significantly the Porte had made promises to Druze lords to turn back their lands 
during the civil strife against the Egyptian regime. 
In spite all these existing discontents of elite groups in the Mountain, it was 
possible to see economic and social developments in different part of the region, such as 
Deir al-Qamar and Zahleh. Both Zahleh and Deir al-Qamar were two predominantly 
Christian towns and the number of Christian population and prosperity increased 
especially during the Double Qaimaqamate regime
98
. Deir al-Qamar had been the 
administrative and economic center of the Mountain beginning with the seventeen 
century. However, by the 1850s, Deir al-Qamar had established itself as the richest 
town in Mount Lebanon, as a Christian city in the heart of the Druze-dominated 
southern districts of the region. It also continued to protect its importance as an 
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administrative center also during the Double Qaimaqamate era
99
.When it comes to 
Zahleh, it is crucial to say that, by the mid-nineteenth century, Zahleh had become 
Mount Lebanon‟s largest commercial center and trade was a natural outgrowth of the 
town due to its favorable geographical location
100
.  Due to their economical 
developments, both Zahleh and Deir al-Qamar‟s prosperity grew as reflected in their 
population figures. According to data which were provided by Leila Fawaz, at the end 
of the eighteenth century, Zahleh‟s population was less than a thousand people or two 
hundred households. When it comes to the beginning of the nineteenth century, Deir al-
Qamar had a population of around 4.000 people. By the late 1850s, the population had 
reached a level of between 10.000 and 12.000 in Zahleh and between 7.000 and 10.000 
in Deir al-Qamar
101
. 
What do all these data about the population and prosperity of these important 
Christian cities of the Mountain show us? First of all, it is important to indicate that, the 
internationalization process of the issues related with this geography especially 
following the Egyptian invasion had an impact on the evolution of certain towns of the 
Mountain into new and crucial trade centers. Secondly, the rising prosperity of the 
Christian towns increased the discontent of the Druze notables about their conditions 
under the new system. It needs to be underlined that, starting with 1845; both in 
political and economic sense, a new Mount Lebanon was coming into being
102
. In the 
words of Youssef Choueiri, the Mountain‟s economic, political and social structures 
were entangled within the multiplex dynamism of Ottoman reform and European 
expansionism
103
. This situation caused the emergence of a new social crisis. 
The above-mentioned economic developments in the northern district of Mount 
Lebanon did not only cause the emergence of discontent among the Druze notables, it 
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caused the emergence of discontent among Maronite peasants of the northern district, 
too. The expansion of European trade and the consequent development of a new urban 
bourgeoisie and its strengthening weakened the stability of the feudal economy
104
. This 
situation became one of the basic reasons of the Kisrawan revolt under the leadership of 
Tanyus Shahin which can be considered as the beginning point of the 1858 Civil War. 
Looking at the previous disturbances, problems of political representation both in 
the southern and northern districts of the Mountain due to heterogeneous population as 
well as the changes in the political system and social structure of the region as a result 
of the post-1841 developments did ignite the fuse for the turning of existing tension 
between Druzes and Maronites sects into a physical strife. The Maronites in the 
southern district of the Mountain who suffered from the Druze hegemony attacked 
Druze villages in 1845. Different than the case in 1841, the Christians and the Druzes 
were equally prepared for violent action and this time it were the Christians who struck 
the first blow
105
. As an eye-witness, Colonel Churchil describes the events of 1845 as in 
the following: 
“In the month of April 1845, the long gathering storm burst, by a general attack, 
from the Maronites on all the Druze quarters. In the district of the Shoof, they were led 
on by their bishop, crufix in hand, after having obtained the sanction of the Turkish 
officer stationed there for the assault”106.  
In general, Churchil sees the Ottoman government as the supporter of Druzes 
against the Maronites and blames the Porte both for the 1845 and 1858 incidents. 
However, I think that, the main concern of the Ottoman state especially in the post-1841 
era was to provide peace and stability in the region. In order to settle the conflict 
between the two sects, Istanbul sent Şekib Efendi who then was the Foreign Minister of 
the Empire to the region in 1845. Şekib Efendi‟s first action was to place under arrest 
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the most important Lebanese leaders of both sects, including the Christian and Druze 
qaimaqams in order to prevent any resistance to the measures he intended to take
107
. 
Afterwards, the Ottoman Foreign Minister undertook negotiations with the local 
parties and foreign diplomats in order to reform the existing Double Qaimaqamate 
system and to determine a set of regulations for the administration of the two districts. 
Finally, on 29 October 1845, the Reglement prepared by Şekib Efendi was 
communicated to the European consuls and its provisions immediately became 
effective
108
. According to this Reglement, Lebanon continued to remain divided into a 
Druze and a Christian qaimaqamate and each headed by a qaimaqam appointed and 
removable by the governor of Sidon. To assist them, each qaimaqam was to have a 
council which was going to be composed of a deputy qaimaqam, a judge and an adviser 
for each of the Sunnite, Druze, Maronite, Greek Orthodox and also Greek Catholic 
sects, and an adviser for the Shiites
109
. It is possible to say that, this advisory council 
was the most significant measure of Şekib Efendi‟s Reglement since these advisors 
were representing the six major communities of the Mountain
110. According to Akarlı, 
these regulations which were revised in 1850 were the first systematic attempt to 
provide the Mountain with a bureaucratic governmental structure; it also prepared the 
ground for establishment of the future Mutasarrifiyat regime
111
. 
3.2.1858 Lebanon Civil War 
The revolt of 1840 and the involvement of peasants in the political events of the 
time might have contributed to putting an end to both the Egyptian occupation and to 
the reign of Bashir II. However, as I have previously mentioned, it did little to transform 
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the feudal system which was the source of grievances and oppression of the peasants of 
the Mountain
112
. 
However, it was again the feudal structure of Mount Lebanon which constituted 
one of the important factors leading to the emergence of the violent events of 1858; it is 
not true to describe the whole story only as a peasant revolt against the oppressor 
sheikhs. The Civil War was also a byproduct of the ideological transformation of the 
inhabitants of Mount Lebanon in terms of their identities and its effect on the way they 
began to describe the land in which they were living. As Makdisi states, the process of 
secterianizing identity was immensely complex. He continues as: 
“…New sectarian fears and possibilities still had to contend with old-regime 
solidarities and geographies. For a sectarian politics to cohere, for it to become 
hegemonic in a Gramscian sense, it would have to become an expression of everyday 
life; it would have to stamp itself indelibly on geography and history. In this task, as 
with so much else in this era of reform, the interplay between local and foreign played 
an immeasurable role.”113 
As can be seen in Makdisi‟s statement, the Mountain was going into an 
ideological transformation and sectarianism was one of the crucial issues that should be 
taken into consideration. It is not possible to totally understand the changes in the 
Mountain and the way to the civil strife without examining factors such as international 
intervention, policies of the Ottoman state and existing social tension between the 
Maronites and the Druzes and division of both parties into two hostile camps. It is 
important to say that all these factors, partition and the violence which commenced as 
early as 1845 cleared the way for sectarian paths of development
114
. 
All these transformations also caused the emergence of new ideological 
perspectives about the future of the Mountain both in Maronite and Druze community. 
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One of the examples to these new perspectives could be seen in the writings of Bishop 
Murad. Bishop Murad represented an idea of a Christian-dominated Mount Lebanon 
and in this social organization Druzes would be reduced into a subordination position
115
. 
In essence his aim was not to reform the social order of the Mountain and rather than 
that, he wanted to stamp a Christian identity on a new possible order
116
. 
Inherently, Bishop Murad was not the only one who had a vision about any 
possible new political and social structure for the Mountain. For instance, Jesuits had 
efforts to reform local Christianity, however worked in precisely the opposite direction 
and promoted segregated Christian spaces rather than a heterogeneous social 
organization with a Druze minority. Another example was Butrus al-Bustani, son of a 
Maronite family in Mount Lebanon. Bustani had a solid educational background that 
was possible in Syria region due to the presence of missionary schools. Even though 
during 1840s Bustani experienced a conversion to Protestantism as a result of his long 
association with missionaries, in the mid 1850s he was converted to a political ideal 
which was Ottomanism
117
. For this reason, when the Ottoman state declared the Reform 
Edict (Hatt-i Hümayun) in February 1856, Bustani realized that it was an important step 
toward integrating the Empire‟s communities into the social and political structure of 
the state and establishing the political structure of the Empire in a new basis
118
. 
3.3. The Kisrawan Revolt 
It should be stated that, the issues related to sectarianism and transformation of the 
feudal system of Mount Lebanon cannot be examined separately from the 
modernization process of the Ottoman Empire and its periphery. So, it would be a big 
mistake to treat the sectarian policies and events of the Mountain as something related 
with the “backwardness” of the Mountain.  
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The main reason behind the Kisrawan Revolt was actually the desperate efforts of 
Druze and Maronite muqatajis in different parts of Mount Lebanon to safeguard their 
interests against the ever - increasing political and social transformations. For instance, 
they blocked an Ottoman attempt to conduct a cadastral survey as a basic step toward 
the proper registration of land and they while at the same time assuming full 
proprietorship of as many lands as possible within their reach
119
. In addition to this, as a 
result of the strengthening of the Jesuits in the northern district of the Mountain, Rome 
began to intervene in political and even everyday life of the Christian population in the 
region. Some Maronite bishops such as Bishop Bustani began to develop distrust 
towards the papal legate in Syria. These Maronite clergymen even claimed that “God 
became angry with the Christians of Lebanon and sought to punish them through the 
papal legate Bernoni then Padre Berzoli who served as the secretary of the papal legate 
in Syria”120.  
Calendar controversy constituted the peak point of the tension between Rome and 
the Christians of the Mountain. Especially the Greek population of Zahleh reacted to it. 
It is possible to say that even the Uniate Christians were equally exasperated but not so 
much over the issue of papal legate as over Rome insisting that they change their 
Eastern calendar for the Latin
121
. In short, both branches of the Greek Church reacted to 
this imposition of the Papal authority. The upheaval started when the Greek Catholic 
Patriarch issued a decree and accepted arranging the date of Easter according to Latin 
calendar
122
. In the eve of the Kisrawan revolt, this unrest caused the emergence of an 
inner division within the Christian community. 
It is possible to say that, the conditions which caused the emergence of Kisrawan 
peasant revolt of 1858 actually began to be formed four years earlier than the revolt, i.e. 
in 1854, when Bashir Ahmad Abu‟l-Lam succeeded his kinsman Haydar Abu‟l-Lam as 
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Christian qaimaqam of the northern district
123
. Qaimaqam Haydar died in May 1854 
after his eleven years of loyal service to the Sultan and his government. A struggle over 
his replacement started, leading to unrest in Maronite society
124. Haydar Abu‟l Lam was 
temporarily replaced by his nephew Bashir Assaf. Assaf was young and he was well 
liked for his personal qualities. However, he did not have any interest in the office. 
From Abu Lam family, Amin Mansur showed open interest for this position. However, 
the governor appointed Bashir Ahmed of Brummana who was quite aggressive and a 
constant thorn in to the Haydar clan and more inclined to Islam than to Maronitism
125
. 
In addition to Maronite suspicions about Bashir Ahmed‟s Christianity, he was known to 
be born as a Druze and the clergy were disturbed by his lack of attachment to the 
church
126. Bashir Ahmed‟s appointment as the new Christian qaimaqam only increased 
the existing tensions among the Maronites and consequently the Maronite community 
was divided into two as the supporters of Assaf (Assafis) and the supporters of Ahmed 
(Ahmedis)
127
. 
In addition to all these intra-communal and administrative problems, the Reform 
Edict of 1856 turned to be an additional source of general unrest in the whole region 
which inevitably affected the crises in Kisrawan specifically. The problems that   
Sublime Porte faced during 1853 Crimean War, showed the necessity of continuing 
centralisation policies by the centre in this peripheral region. To mention briefly, the 
outbreak of the Crimean War in 1853 caused the emergence of a momentary surge of 
patriotic expressions of loyalty to the sultan. In order to show this loyalty, for instance 
Abu Lam emirs volunteered their services to the sultan for the war with Russia and they 
offered to recruit Christians for the army. Druze chieftains including representing 
families such as Arslan, Abu Nakad and Talhuq together with their qaimaqam Amin 
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Arslan also volunteered for service in the Ottoman army in order to fight in defense of 
the Ottoman state
128
. Ottoman state also paid to these families for their preparations for 
the war. When the reporting time for soldiers arrived, only 912 men appeared and 
among them only one out of three was a Druze
129
.  
The Crimean War, led by an Ottoman-European alliance against Russia, resulted 
in an increase in the level of international intervention in politics of the Ottoman. As a 
consequence of international diplomatic pressure, the Islahat Reform Edict was issued. 
This new Hatt-ı Hümayun, among other issues, offered Christians exemption from 
military service in exchange for a fee which was named as badal of 5000 piasters per 
adult male
130
. Christians opposed this new practice since they argued that this 
exemption fee was introduced the old haraj which the rescript abolished in a new 
guise
131
. In opposition to the Christian community, governors and local emirs supported 
this new policy since they perceived it as a new income. 
Specifically in Kisrawan, in addition to all these developments and problems, 
local people were suffering under the rule of Khazin Shaikhs. Much of the land in 
Kisrawan was controlled by the shaykhs of the Khazin family and their relationship 
with their peasants was dictated by the iqta system
132
.The lease contract between the 
shaykh and the peasant was regulating the peasant‟s responsibilities such as the amount 
of land tax he was supposed to pay, deposit, etc. and the landlord had the right to dictate 
what the peasant was to cultivate on his parcel and also to extract other forms of corveé 
not only from the peasant who signed the lease but also from his family; for instance the 
women of peasant‟s family could be required to work in the shaykh‟s household133. All 
these regulations caused significant suffering of Kisrawan peasants under the harsh rule 
of the Khazin family. 
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Even though the Khazin family continued their oppressive rule over Kisrawan, 
this did not mean that the mentality in the region was the same with the mentality of 
pre-1841 period. In addition to all its administrative regulations; reforms that came 
together with the Tanzimat, also promoted a secular Ottoman nationalism which we will 
go into details in the coming chapter and it proposed the safeguarding of the private 
property. Ussama Makdisi indicates that, as Selim Deringil also mention, Tanzimat 
modernization also produced a legitimacy crisis, a lag between the expectations of the 
empire‟s official elites and the absorption of the new ideology into society134. 
Ussama Makdisi properly evaluates the Kisrawan incident as a crisis in the 
communal representation unfolded in the Mountain and as a struggle over the meaning 
of community and geography in the post-partition world
135
. This is an important point 
of view, because just to explain the whole event as “Kisrawani peasants rose against the 
Khazins and their allies” would not be enough. Class struggle certainly exists, but this 
confrontation was more than a physical struggle for the control of land. All these 
uprisings cannot be thought separately from the spread of sectarianism in the region. 
Tanyus Shahin can be seen both in ideological and practical senses as the leader 
of the revolt. To mention briefly, Shahin‟s personal background facilitated his effort to 
present a subversive “Christian” alternative to the status quo. He was born into poverty 
and became a muleteer associated with the Lazarist missionary school in Rayfun
136
.  
The case of Tanyus Shahin shows us the probable ideological effect of missionary 
schools in the Mountain. We know that, Lazarists obtained for him credentials from the 
French consulate in Beirut that allowed him to travel into cities and this allowed him to 
keep close company with village priests
137
.  
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Tanyus Shahin‟s expectations from the Reform Edict were quite different; in fact 
he justified the revolt by the decree. As Makdisi claims, the Sultan and his reforming 
bureaucrats assumed that traditional social order which provides the separation of high 
and low and also elite and non-elite would remain unchanged by reform. This means 
that, Ottoman officials thought that the right to religious equality in a modernizing 
empire was possible and desirable only if all subjects preserved their station in life and 
in the social structure
138
. However, there were also alternative ways of reading and 
interpreting the Tanzimat like those belonging to Tanyus Shahin. Shahin believed that 
the Tanzimat mandated equality not only between but also within religious 
communities
139
. According to Shahin, the preservation of post-Tanzimat Christianity 
was dependent on the liberation of Kisrawan from Khazin domination and, soon 
enough, from the grip that the Druze landowners maintained over Christians in the 
mixed districts
140
. 
When the partisans of Bashir Assaf were busy with organizing their rallies and 
drafting their petitions against Bashir Ahmed, the peasants in different villages of 
Kisrawan held their own meetings to discuss their grievances against their landlords
141
. 
They even introduced their own administrative bodies and choose their own 
representatives. The young men of each village in Kisrawan assembled and organized 
themselves under the leadership of a shaykh shabab, which can be translated as young 
shaykh, in order to defend their community and interests against the feudal injustices 
and the oppression of Khazin family
142
. At the beginning Khazin shaykhs supported the 
political actions of peasants because they thought that this organized peasant 
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community might be manipulated against the Christian qaimaqam. However, later on 
the Kisrawan uprising took a quite violent form
143
. 
On 3 January 1859, the peasants‟ spokesman declared the demands of the crowd 
and demanded equality in payment of taxes, abolition of extra legal recruitment and also 
right to elect their own representatives
144
. These demands reflected clearly the 
interpretation of Kisrawani peasants of the provisions of the Hatt-ı Hümayuns145. By 
April 1859, 600 members of the Khazin family, shaykhs, women and children had been 
chased out of their homes with only their wives‟ to show for themselves146. Their 
fortunes consisted of land and payments in kind from the peasants. No one from the 
Khazin family lost their lives in this struggle. 
3.4. The Context of the Civil War 
As previously mentioned, the role of the Kisrawan Revolt is quite crucial in the 
way of the development of 1860 events. Because of this historical importance of the 
Kisrawan incident; Leila Fawaz sees it as the beginning point of the civil war and 
claims that even if it cannot be accepted as the beginning of the civil war, it is for sure 
that two Christian groups, Kisrawanis and Zahalnis, helped to unleash it
147
. 
Even though Leila Fawaz‟s argument is open to discussion, it is quite obvious that 
the rebellion which emerged in Kisrawan unsettled the rest of Mount Lebanon and 
especially in the mixed districts of the south, it increased the social tension and it was 
only a matter of time before existing political, social and economic grievances were 
channeled into sectarian fighting and the civil war of 1860
148
. 
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The success of Kisrawani peasants against the shaykhs of Khazin family raised 
the hopes of peasants throughout Mount Lebanon, especially among the peasants who 
inhabited Druze districts
149
. However, as the sectarian hostilities were quite strong in 
the region, the Druze peasants were distrustful to their Christian neighbors and they 
were reluctant to join them in risings against the Druze shaykhs
150
.  
Accumulation of all these social and political tensions exploited and caused the 
turn of all these complaints and demands into a civil war in 1859 in Beit Meri. Two 
children, one of them a Maronite and the other a Druze, began to fight in a street of Beit 
Meri on 30 August 1859
151
. The parents of these children involved into the quarrel and 
this simple fight between two children became quite serious. The outraged father of the 
Maronite boy backed by three friends reprimanded the Druze and demanded 
punishment. The Druze father felt being insulted because of this counter attack from the 
Maronite side; he appealed to his relatives and his co-religionists and they came back 
the morning after in order to demand an apology from the Maronites
152
. According to 
the memoirs of Colonel Churchill, the Maronite side was mistook this action of Druzes 
for a challenge and they rushed to arms, and fired a general volley on the Druzes, 
following it up by a strong attack
153
. According to the data provided by Churchill, the 
Druzes were driven out of the village with a huge loss at the end of the first attack of 
Maronites. And he continues:  
“… The next day, a Sunday, the Druzes rallied; a desperate encounter, which 
lasted all the day, ensued between the two sects, and the Christians were in their turn 
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defeated. On the whole, however, the Druzes had lost in killed twenty-eight more than 
the Christians, who on this occasion had displayed unusual bravery.”154 
At the same time, a Christian band which consisted of 260 to 300 men and led by 
Tanyus Shahin, who was then the shaykh al-shahab of Reifun and also the leader of 
Kisrawani revolt, came to Naccache which was a village half-way between Kisrawan 
and Beirut, to appropriate the silk crop of the Kisrawani shaykhs
155
. To the Druzes, to 
see the presence of Kisrawanis in the plain of Beirut and so close to Matn region where 
the Druzes were living among the Christians, was equal to a provocation. On May 26, 
Hurşid Pasha who was the Ottoman governor general in Beirut, had established a 
military camp a mile away from Naccashe on the Damascus road
156
. According to the 
memoirs of Churchill, he there summoned both the Druze and Maronite chiefs to his 
presence, and peremptorily enjoined them to keep the peace
157
. At once order was re-
established but Druzes did not remain silent to the Beit Meri attack of Maronites.  
Hurşid Pasha has been considered as one of the political actors to blame for the 
occurrence of the Civil War. Churchill says that the action of Hurşid Pasha obviously 
showed the power of the Turks over the people of the Mountain to enforce obedience to 
their commands. However, later as the tension began to increase between two 
communities, the Porte proceeded to draw closer relations which already existed 
between them and the Druzes
158
. Churchill also claims that, several Druze shaykhs took 
the unusual step of spending the winter of 1859-1860 at Beirut. Here their conferences 
with the Turkish authorities were long and quite frequent, and almost of daily 
occurrence
159
.  
After the Beit Meri attack and the march of the Kisrawanis, fighting between the 
two sects started to spread to the whole region. On May 31, fighting broke out in Arqub 
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and the region around Zahleh
160
. Zahalnis were in rush to attack to the Druzes in 
retaliation for their attacks on the Christians of Arqub district. However, on their way to 
Zahleh, they were entrapped by the Druzes
161
. 
 All the attacks of the Druzes and the problems of Maronite community about 
their leaders and military organization caused the spread of panic among the Christian 
community of the Mountain. The condition of the Christians of Ba‟abda and Gharb 
districts is clearly described by Henry Harris Jessup, who was an American missionary 
in Syria region and was living in „Abay which was the seat of Abu Nakads, at the 
time
162
. He says that: 
“On Saturday the 26th, we made an American flag to hoist over the mission 
premises as a protection in case the hordes from Hauran should invade this district, for 
we had no fear from the Lebanon Druzes. The whole population were in a state of 
apprehension. Bodies of armed Druzes, horse and foot, marched from village to village, 
singing their weird song, „How sweet, how sweet to kill the Christians‟. … At ten 
o‟clock we went down to the little church under Mr. Calhoun‟s house. That church was 
an old tank or reservoir belonging to the Im Hassein house which was burned in 1845, 
and repaired and occupied by Mr. Calhoun. It was my turn to preach. I looked down on 
a company of anxious faces. I had begun the service and was reading the first verse of 
„My faith looks up to the Thee,‟ when the report of a gun nearby, followed by a scream, 
startled the congregation. Just then a man ran by the church door shouting, „Abu 
Shehedan is killed. Rise and run for your lives!‟ That church was emptied in a moment. 
… The entire male Christian population fled, over walls, terraces, vineyards and 
through pine groves and the rocky slope, avoiding the roads.”163 
Druzes attacks on B‟abda and its districts caused an important amount of 
destruction of property but little loss of life. Salibi says that a few Christian fugitives, 
fleeing their villages to Beirut were entrapped and killed by Druzes or by Turkish 
                                                          
160
 Leila Fawaz, “An Occassion for War: Civil Conflict in Lebanon and 
Damascus in 1860”, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), p.51. 
161
 Ibid.51. 
162
 Kamal Salibi, “The Modern History of Lebanon”, (New York: Caravan 
Books, 1993), p.91. 
163
 Henry Harris Jessup, “Fifty-Three Years in Syria”, (New York: Fleming H. 
Revell Co., 1910), vol.1 p.168-169. 
49 
 
irregulars
164
. As the fight continued between two communities, the European powers 
appealed for calm. European consuls visited Hurşid Pasha on June 1 at Hazmiyya 
offering help but also pressing him to put an end to the conflict
165. However, Hurşid 
Pasha responded that he was “exerting himself to the utmost to check the war”166. For 
saving himself from the responsibility of all deaths and destruction, he blamed a small 
group of Maronites who were known as “Maronite Young Men‟s League”167. As the 
negotiations continued between European consuls, local authorities and the Ottoman 
centre, the situation continued to deteriorate. Towards the end of May, the Christians of 
Deir al-Qamar were shocked to find themselves blockaded by the Druzes
168
. When they 
attempted to leave the region, Druze outposts met them at every turn. Colonel Churchil 
describes the condition of blockade in Deir al-Qamar clearly: 
“… The roads were intercepted, and their supplies were cut off. The corn in the 
surrounding fields had been reaped and carried away. Credulously relying on Druze 
professions of friendship and on the protection of the Turks, they had made not the 
slightest preparations for war. They had even refused to listen to appeals sent to them 
from different quarters, and especially from the Maronite bishop, Toubyah, to join the 
common cause, to rise in general defence.”169 
So, under these terrible conditions, on June 1, the joint forces of the Janbalats, 
„Imads and Abu Nakads fell on the town. Salibi states that, the battle in Deir al-Qamar 
raged all day
170
. Christians desperately tried to resist the Druze attack while the 
Ottoman governor, Hurşid Pasha and the town garrison refusing to interfere, stood by 
and watched the entire massacre. It is possible to say that, the total cleansing of 
conquered areas was not a shameful act from the viewpoint of the Druzes, since they 
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thought that the elimination of the Catholic and more generally the Christian other was 
the only way to guarantee their security for now and also for the future
171
. This is one 
reason why the massacres of Deir al-Qamar and Zahleh were that much violent. 
Leila Fawaz explains the existing tensions culminating to a civil war mainly as a 
responsibility of the Maronites in Mount Lebanon. However, it is necessary to look at 
all these developments from a different context. According to Ussama Makdisi, the 
random acts of violence that preceded the war in the summer of 1860 were not simply 
indications of anarchy. It is more suitable to say that they amounted to cumulative 
blows against any notion of a nonsectarian geography; the intercommunal violence of 
1860 actually reflected the desperate struggle to reconstitute society along pure and 
segregated sectarian lines
172
.  
Failure of the Ottoman troops to stop the Druze massacres and the relative 
military weakness of the Maronites caused major losses of life in the Maronite side. 
According to the data provided by Engin Akarlı, when the Druzes had come to an end 
with the massacres, about 15.000 Maronites were dead and tens of thousands were 
homeless fugitives
173
. This situation led to the intervention of the reformist in Istanbul 
and the European powers, especially France. Firstly, the Foreign Minister Fuad Pasha 
rushed to the region and began to arrest Druzes. About the issue of the punishment of 
the Druzes, in memoirs of Colonel Churchill, it is possible to witness quite interesting 
details about the policy that he followed. In his memoirs he describes the arrestment 
process as the following: 
“Fuad Pasha now turned his attention to the punishment of the Druze 
commonalty. With this view he assembled the Christian bishops, and invoked their 
assistance to assist him in carrying out a measure so imperatively necessary. … Fuad 
Pasha, after making them an impressive allocation, concluded by calling on them to 
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furnish him with a list of those amongst the Druzes who were known to have been the 
“most barbarous”174.  
The list was provided by the Maronite Commission which was consisted of 
sixteen members. According to the data which was provided by Churchill, Christian 
deputies had asked for the heads of around 4600 Druzes
175
. This was quite a huge 
number for Fuad Pasha and he asked from the deputies of the commission to review 
their lists and asked them to put the names of the criminally most deeply implicated of 
the Druzes. As a result of this revision, the new number was reduced to 1200
176
. On the 
8
th
 of December, a court martial was established for the Druze prisoners who were 
arrested according to the list which was given to Fuad Pasha in Mukhtara. However, the 
number of Druze criminals in the list was even more reduced to 300 and only very few 
of them were actually punished as a result of these trials
177
.  
3.5. The Era of Mutasarrifiyat 
The Civil War between Maronite and Druze sects ended with a major human cost 
for the Mountain. As Kamal Salibi mentioned, in less than four weeks, eleven thousand 
Maronites  were killed by Druzes and irregular Ottoman soldiers in total, approximately 
four thousand people including many from the Druze sect had perished of destitution 
and nearly a hundred thousand had became homeless fugitives
178
.  
Almost one month later than Fuad Pasha, French forces arrived Beirut in order to 
intervene in the conflict between two sects, even though it was a little bit late for that 
after too many casualties. All the violence in Mount Lebanon also created a power 
vacuum in the political system and it was a necessity to do something to prevent the 
emergence of any possible confrontation in the near future. For this reason, the 
European ambassadors, which included Austria, Great Britain, France, Prussia and 
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Russia came together with the Ottoman representatives on 9 June 1861. The Double 
Qaimaqamate system of 1842 was replaced by the Reglement Organique, i.e. a new 
regulation for the administration of Mount Lebanon.   
The new regulation was not totally different from the Double Qaimaqamate 
system, the Reglement Organique was also based on the sectarian division. However, 
certain changes were made especially in the administrative system. According to the 
article one of the protocol adopted by the Sublime Porte and the European Powers, “The 
Christian Governor entrusted with the administration of Lebanon shall be chosen by the 
Porte, to which he shall be directly responsible. He shall have the title of Müşür, and he 
shall reside normally at Deir-al-Qamar, which will again fall under his direct authority. 
Invested for a three year term, he will nevertheless be removable at pleasure, but his 
dismissal shall not take place without a trial. Three months prior to the expiration of his 
term, the Porte, before taking action, shall seek a new agreement with the 
represantatives of the Great Powers”179. As we can obviously see in the first article, the 
governor or the mutasarrif was directly responsible to the Porte even though he was 
appointed following a common decision of both European powers and the Ottoman 
State.  
With the changes were done in the Reglement, in 1862, the parties of the 
regulation decided to establish and Administrative Council to provide counsel and 
assistance to the mutasarrıf. The Council was to include twelve members: 3 Druzes, 4 
Maronites, 2 Greek Orthodox, 1 Greek Catholic, 1 Shiite and 1 Sunni Muslim
180
. When 
it comes to the issue of taxation and financial administration, according to the 
Reglement, the mutasarrıf was responsible for collecting taxes and administrating 
finances. The Administrative Council was obliged to distribute the tax burden among 
the people of the Mountain and also to supervise the administration of finances
181
. Even 
though the Porte promised to assist the economy of the Mountain until the new 
Mutasarrifiyat system would be able to run the economy of the region by its own, 
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between the years of 1877 and 1881, the central government was not able to pay the 2.1 
million piasters of subsidy it had promised to the Mutasarrifiyat. Engin Akarlı indicates 
that in the following years the Porte again failed to fulfill its promise to cover the 
Mutasarrifiyat‟s deficit of 852.000 piasters from the revenue of Ankara and Adana182. 
Another crucial issue for strengthening the Mutasarrifiyat system was the 
question of justice. After the certain amendments in the Reglement in 1864, the powers 
of peace and justice were given to the village sheikhs, who were also called as “shaykh 
of peace”183. When it came to the process of determining these shaykhs, Akarlı indicates 
that each shaykh was elected by the village community as a whole, regardless of its 
sectarian composition
184
. However, the shayks were not the only judicial authority of 
the Mountain; they were only dealing with small crimes. Akarlı says that, civil cases 
involving sums over 200 piasters and violence were to be decided on by the courts of 
first instance and they were also allowed to review the appealable sentences of the 
justice of peace
185
. The central court was including six official counsels representing the 
six major sects
186
.  
It is important to note that, in formation of justice and administration system the 
major priority of the European powers and the Ottoman state was to create a balance 
between the two sects and avoid any possible confrontation between the two parties in 
the future. For this reason, for the new Mutasarrifiyat regime, according to Article 3 of 
1864 Reglement, Mount Lebanon was divided into seven districts and “each with an 
administrative head to be appointed by the governor from the different sect, either by 
virtue of numbers or virtue of territorial possession”187.  
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4. CHAPTER III 
THE MUTASARRIFS OF MOUNT LEBANON 
As a result of the process which was triggered with the intervention in Lebanon by 
Muhammad Ali, a new development emerged in terms of state and identity formation of 
the region. As Hanna Ziadeh argues in his study, the history of Lebanese nation-
building starts with the first reglementary texts and constitutes the first rupture if we 
examine the events happened since 1840 from a constitutional perspective
188
. Even 
though it was not a constitution truly, the Reglement of Şekib Efendi is quite crucial in 
this sense, because as it has been mentioned in previous chapters, it was a significant 
attempt to weaken the political and economic authority of local noble families and it 
accelerated the process started with the reforms of Muhammad Ali Pasha that led to the 
modernization of state mechanisms. In other words, the mutasarrifiyat regime provided 
Mount Lebanon a strong basis of modern administration and as a byproduct of this 
process, a class of Lebanese civil officials began to be trained by the educational 
institutions newly established in the Mountain
189
. 
Specifically for the structuration of Lebanon as an entity separate from Greater 
Syria, which lasted between the years of 1861 to 1920, the mutasarrifiyat regime 
constitutes a huge importance. Even though it can be acknowledged as the era of peace 
as we can see in Engin Akarlı‟s study, it is important to indicate that this was the era 
when the ideological perspective of the region‟s intellectuals changed in terms of their 
own ethnic identities. Together with this process, Mount Lebanon became one of the 
regions in the Middle East where a lively press life developed and numerous 
newspapers emerged related to different issues ranging from literature to politics and to 
health was published by the intellectual names such as Butrus al-Bustani and his son 
                                                          
188
 Hanna Ziadeh, “Secterianism and Inter-Communal Nation-Building in 
Lebanon”, (London: Hurst, 2006), p. 55. 
189
 Kamal Salibi, “The Modern History of Lebanon”, (New York: Caravan 
Books, 1993), p.117. 
55 
 
Salim. These conditions helped the acceleration of the spread of knowledge all over the 
region
190
. 
As it was seen in the previous chapter, with the beginning of the mutasarrifyat 
era, the Ottoman centre, together with the European commission, France and Britain in 
particular, continued to the modernization policies over the local administrative 
institutions. However, though the reform attempts continued with the new era, they 
encountered with certain objections and oppositions. First of all, like in the case of 
Yusuf Karam, important local political figures of the Mountain resisted to the authority 
of the new governor, Davud Pasha. In fact, there were still ongoing competitions for the 
political authority in the region between different actors
191
.  
Although the main motivation behind the acceptance of the Reglement Organique 
was providing peace and political stability of the region, the Ottoman centre saw it as an 
opportunity to strengthen its own authority over one of its peripheral regions. However, 
the increasing political awareness and rising consciousness about ethnic identities 
became an important obstacle for realization of this intention of the Sublime Porte. 
Within this context, it is rather meaningful to look at the ideas of Ottomanism and 
Lebanonism prevalent in the region for this era in a comparative way. Also, the conflict 
between these two identity policies should be examined with relation to the 
centralization policies of the Ottoman state. For this reason, to understand the identity 
issues and crisis related with it, it is quite important to examine the policies of the 
appointed mutasarrifs and their ideological standpoints in this context. 
In this chapter, the aim will be to analyze the centralization policies of the first 
four mutasarrifs of Mount Lebanon, who were Davud Pasha (r.1861-68), Franko Pasha 
(r.1868-73), Rüstem Pasha (1873-83), and Vasa Pasha (1883-92).
192
 While discussing 
administrative measures of these mutasarrifs, it will be tried to show the overlaps and 
contrasts as well as similarities and dissimilarities within the context of centralization 
                                                          
190
 Eliezer Tauber, “The Emergence of the Arab Movements”, (London: Frank 
Cass, 1993), p.7-10. 
191
 Hanna Ziadeh, “Secterianism and Inter-Communal Nation-Building in 
Lebanon”, (London: Hurst, 2006), p.75-78.  
192
 Engin Akarlı, “The  Long Peace: Ottoman Lebanon 1861-1920”, (Berkeley: 
University of California Press), p.194. 
56 
 
policies. Related with the augmentation of the centralization policies certain parts of the 
era of Abdulhamid (r.1876-1909) will be the main focus point of this chapter. 
4.1. New Policies in the Mountain and Mutasarrifs of Mount Lebanon  
The Reglement Organique came to the existence with the common decision of 
European Commission and Ottoman Empire. The first article states that, “Cebel-i 
Lübnan taraf-ı devlet-i aliyyeden mensub doğrudan doğruya Bab-ı Ali‟ye merbut bir 
Hristiyan mutasarrıf ile idare olunacaktır”193. The first condition was that the mutasarrif 
was required to be a citizen of Ottoman Empire and secondly he was have to be chosen 
among the Christian members of the Bab-i Ali. In essence, this was an advantage for the 
Ottoman state because due to the newly ended tensions between the Maronite and Druze 
sects, any appointment of a mutasarrif from one of these two would cause discontent 
and even revolt of the other group. Also the condition of that the mutasarrif should be 
an Ottoman citizen raised the hopes of the Ottoman center about establishing its own 
central authority in the region. 
In order to remember, the second issue which was indicated a lot in the document 
of Reglement Organique was the jurisdiction and justice issue. According to seventh 
article of the Reglement Organique, “Hakim-ül Sulh vazifesini ifa eden karye şeyhleri 
ikiyüz kuruşa kadar olan davalara bilistinaf hükm edeceklerdir. İki yüz kuruşdan yukarı 
olan davanın reviyyeti birinci derecede olan mahkeme meclislerine aid bulunacaktır”194. 
This division between the peace courts and first degree jurisdiction courts shows that 
the powers that arranged the Reglement Organique did not want to see powerful 
shaykhs and local authorities because they had the probability of causing any uprisings 
or conflicts in their villages. Particularly this was very crucial for the Porte, because 
according to the sixth article that can be seen in the Salname, the mutasarrif of Mount 
Lebanon was able to appoint the judges of the first degree jurisdiction courts
195
. This 
article can be considered as quite important for the political motivations of the Porte 
over the Mountain, because as it was indicated in the first article, the Porte had the 
advantage of appointing one of the members of the Ottoman bureaucracy, therefore the 
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appointment of the judges by the mutasarrif who in turn was appointed by the Porte 
provided an important gain to the center for its centralization policies over the 
periphery. 
Under the context of these administrative and political changes, the important 
issue that needs to be clarified is the situation of the upper class local families. As it was 
discussed in the first chapter, due to the feudal characteristics of Mount Lebanon, local 
families were quite affective in the administrative and political life of the Mountain. 
One of the main motivations of the new mutasarrifiyat administration was abolishing 
this political hegemony of shaykhs and noble families in the region. However, as it can 
be understood it was in fact not possible to abolish the feudal structure which lasted for 
many centuries in the region. Rather than establishing a central administrative political 
structure by force, the coordinating states of the new regime, Ottoman Empire and 
European Commission, decided to integrate those local leaders into the new system by 
giving them important administrative jobs. This policy is quite apparent in the Salnames 
of the region of the era. According to the Salname-i Cebel-i Lebanon that belongs to 
1306/1888-89, during the era of Vasa Pasha, the reis vekili (deputy chair) of the 
mutasarrifyat‟s Meclis-i İdare (administrative council) was a certain Mir Efendi from 
the Shihab family
196
. When we look at the local administrative units, in the canton 
(nahiye) of Garb-i Aks nahiyesi, we see Mir Şekib Aslan, as the director of this small 
administrative unit
197
. Again in the district (kaza) of Cezin, we see Mir Said Şihab as 
the governor of the region
198
. All these important names from Maronite and Druze 
families clearly demonstrate the integration of these families to the new central regime 
and this would be interpreted as the policy of eliminating their local influence as the 
feudal lords.  
Under these circumstances, the Porte appointed to the new and important position 
of mutasarrif (subgovernor) of Mount Lebanon a suitable name, i.e. Davud Pasha as its 
first administrator in 1861. According to Philip Hitti, Davud Pasha was a talented and 
especially able man. One of the most important characteristics of Davud Pasha was his 
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determined struggle against the feudal lords in the south and Maronite Patriarchate in 
the north. He also established a school for Druzes in „Abayh which still bears his 
name
199
. At this point, it is crucial to give brief biographical information about Davud 
Pasha. He was of Catholic Armenian origin and his real name was Karapet. He was 
born in İstanbul in 1816 and he went to University of Berlin for his higher education. 
After he came back to Istanbul, he was employed at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 
Istanbul. Later, he was appointed as an attaché at the Ottoman Embassy in Berlin. 
During his mission in Berlin, he also had a chance to study German law and he received 
an honorary doctorate for his remarkable study on this field by the Faculty of Law in 
Jena University. In 1856 he was appointed by an Imperial writ as the Ottoman General 
Consul at Vienna for a short time period and in 1858 he became the state printing 
director of Aleppo
200
. As can be seen in here, Davud Pasha was a well-educated 
Ottoman bureaucrat and his successful career as a loyal Ottoman bureaucrat made him 
the best fit for this new mission as the mutasarrif of the Mountain. He continued to 
show his talent and wisdom in Mount Lebanon too and this led to the prolongation of 
his office for five more years
201
. So, he remained in the Mountain as the mutasarrif of 
this region between the years of 1861-1868.  
In an ideological sense, it is possible to say that Davud Pasha like his superior 
Fuad Pasha was the Ottoman personification of the Tanzimat
202
. This means that, as a 
bureaucrat he worked and studied in abroad, he believed in the reformation and 
centralization ideas that were proposed with the two main edicts of the Tanzimat era. He 
did his best to represent the political authority of the Ottoman center in this locality and 
to provide peace and stability. As can be seen in Hannah Ziadhe‟s study, he tried to 
impress upon the people of Mount Lebanon the brand new spirit of the mutasarrifiyat 
and in one of his speech which included elements of Şekib Efendi‟s tanzimat-rhetoric, 
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he promised “calmness for the ahali … and a system of justice and righteousness”203. 
This vision of Davud Pasha also supports the traditional Ottoman perspective which 
promises justice and calmness for the ahali. We learn from one of the archival 
documents that Davud Pasha, in the summer of 1279/July-August 1862, while visiting 
small villages of Mount Lebanon, hears some alarming news originating from one of 
the villages. When he and his military unit move there immediately, they see that the 
people of the village had no idea about the panic-producing news which eventually 
proves to be a wrong alert. All the villagers go down to the main road to meet the 
mutasarrif; after entering the village Davud Pasha publicly announces the righteousness 
and compassion of the sultan toward the population, which is received with 
thankfulness by the peasants.
204
. In fact, Davud Pasha gave huge importance to the 
preservation of stability and security in the region and also the happiness of people 
under his rule and their support to hin and to the new mutasarrifiyat regime was quite 
crucial for him and in this document this situation is highly indicated. Another crucial 
point that can be seen in the same document is that, Davud Pasha provides justice “in 
the name of the Sultan”. As it will be talked about later, even though Davud Pasha also 
tries to create his own strong leader image, he also did not lose his loyalty to the sultan 
and the central authority. In order to provide the justice and security in the Mountain,  
Davud Pasha allotted additional funds to the Mountain in order to establish a regular 
law enforcement agency under the new administration which was called the 
gendermarie and he also ensured the payment of indemnities to the victims of civil war 
out of the central treasury
205
. The Porte not only provided assistance to Davud Pasha for 
establishing the new order but also granted tax exemptions to the Lebanese population. 
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Furthermore, Davud Pasha created special credit opportunities in order to repair the 
economic damage done to the Mountain‟s economy by the years of civil war206.  
Davud Pasha‟s personal attempts to ensure the establishment of a peaceful society 
and the support which was given by the Ottoman centre to these efforts did not find the 
necessary resonance among all segments of the Lebanese society. Though the Civil War 
was ended, this did not mean the end of the disappearance of existing division in the 
society and the struggle for power between different parties in Mount Lebanon. Firstly 
the Maronite Church opposed to the system of the mutasarrifiyat and it continued to 
demand the re-establishment of the Emirate because in the perception of the church the 
emirate system was the symbol of Great Christian Lebanon under an indigenous prince 
with a larger margin of independence from the Porte
207. Davud Pasha‟s efforts of 
institute direct control of the Ottoman centre over the region was seen as a major threat 
by Maronite Church to its unrivalled position hitherto enjoyed. In addition to the threat 
of the possible Ottoman hegemony over the region, Maronites also were not happy 
about their “senior partner” position with the Druzes who were junior yet equally 
indispensable partner
208
. For this reason Maronite Church criticized the articles of 
Reglement and wanted to be acknowledged as a unique and separate institution of the 
Mountain. 
The second important opposition to the new system came from Yusuf Karam. 
Karam was one of the populist leaders of Mount Lebanon like Tanyus Shahin. The local 
Maronite Christian population was quite open to the appeal of those leaders. He was an 
anti-clerical and anti-feudal leader from Ihden
209
.As Albert Hourani indicated, Yusuf 
Karam led the forlorn hope of the Maronite society to resist against the compromises 
involved in the Reglement Organique
210
. Ideologically, Yusuf Karam did not only claim 
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the autonomy and national representation of Mount Lebanon within the Ottoman 
Empire, but he also demanded equality for all the Arabs living within the boundaries of 
the Empire
211. Karam‟s emphasis on the Arab element was actually one of the very 
important indicators of the emergence of a new ideological awareness concerning 
ethnic, national or religious identity among at least some of the regional population, 
particularly among intellectuals and educated people. As a part of his convictions 
Karam also began to a campaign with his supporters against the new governor which 
lasted for many years because of his ideas and personal ambitions, and he called his 
Lebanese patriots to be true patriots. In addition to his ideas, personal ambitions also 
played a role in his attitude.  In one of his speeches, he called all his Lebanese patriots 
to be true patriots and to stand against the policies of division pursued by external 
powers, including also the Ottoman state
212
. The rejection of the Reglement in the 
northern parts of Mount Lebanon worked to the advantage of Yusuf Karam as he 
declared himself as the spokesman and leader of the unsatisfied Maronites
213
. In this 
process Karam also looked for establishing good relations to gain support from 
powerful foreign actors. In fact, he established good relations with British government 
and also with some of the independent minded officers in the French Expeditionary 
Corporations which were acting together with the French government
214
.  
Davud Pasha tried to do his best in order to stop these opposition movements. 
First of all, he consulted to the leaders of the Lebanese communities about the issue of 
the appointment of representative officials at village level and to the Administrative 
Council. He had only a few difficulties with the Druze, Orthodox and Greek Catholic 
communities and fortunately for him, in the mixed districts feudal notables and at least 
two Maronite bishops who were Tubiya and Butrus al Bustani accepted to cooperate 
with Davud Pasha
215
. However, it was not easy to end the uprisings under the command 
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of Yusuf Karam and the prevailing unhappiness of the Maronites in the northern region 
about the new system. The main reason of Davud Pasha‟s failure for his attempt to 
come into terms with Yusuf Karam was the uncooperative attitude of the Maronite 
Patriarchate. Karam was sent back to Ihdin but when he came back, he began to gather 
armed bands around him
216
. Ottoman troops and also Davud Pasha avoided engaging in 
a battle with Karam‟s armed bands and as Yusuf Karam failed to inspire a massive 
revolt against the mutasarrifiyat regime, the Ottoman troops brought in March 1866 
most of the strategic places in the northern part of the Mountain including Ihdin under 
Davud Pasha‟s control in March 1866 and Yusuf Karam was expelled to Beirut217. 
It is possible to say that, Davud Pasha supported the centralisation policies of the 
Ottoman state in comparison to other mutasarrifs except for Rüstem Pasha. The best 
indicator of this attitude has been his focus on the road building. Davud Pasha paid 
peculiar attention to building new roads to the every possible village or town of the 
Mountain. This policy provided a reliable transportation infrastructure to the every town 
and village of Mount Lebanon; this was one of the best ways to provide public services 
and also to ensure state authority at every single part of the region
218
. According to 
Samir Khalaf, in essence all the mutasarrifs initiated their terms by declaring their 
intentions to guarantee public security and protect civil liberties and some of them, 
particularly Davud Pasha and Rüstem Pasha, took measures to control bribery and 
corruption and also punish crime
219
. These measures also served as convenient tools to 
develop trust of people of the Mountain both towards the new system and also towards 
the Ottoman centre. 
The issue of cooperation between the Ottoman center and mutasarrif Davud Pasha 
is quite crucial to be examined a little bit further. As it was said before, Davud Pasha 
tended to provide political stability in Mount Lebanon as a representative of the center. 
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On the one hand, another important point is that, even though Ottoman Empire had the 
right to appoint one of its bureaucrats as the mutasarrif of the Mountain, the Reglement 
Organique was actually declaring an autonomous Mount Lebanon.  On the other hand, 
as Akarlı indicated in his study, when we look at the correspondences between Davud 
Pasha and Ottoman centre it is clearly the case that the Porte considered Mount 
Lebanon still as one of the ordinary administrative units of the Ottoman territory
220
. 
There is no mistake in this perception of the Sublime Porte; Mount Lebanon was still an 
organic part of the Empire‟s territory. Under these circumstances, despite his loyalty, 
certain problems emerged between the Pasha and the Porte in terms of political 
centralization issue. A new political system and hegemony was to be created, but whose 
authority was it going to be? Was it to be exclusively the Sublime Porte‟s, European 
Commission‟s or the Mutasarrif‟s? The persistence of this question caused inevitable 
tensions between the Porte and Davud Pasha. For instance, Davud Pasha was blamed 
for his inability to extend governmental authority into the northern districts of the 
Mountain and also for his style of statesmanship which was irreconcilable with Ottoman 
notions of statesmanship
221
. The reason for this uneasiness of the center was the attempt 
of Davud Pasha to cultivate an image of himself as an ideal leader for the people of a 
self-sufficient and self-governing Mount Lebanon
222
. Akarli recognizes a profound 
difference between the earlier years of Davud Pasha‟s mission as a mutasarrif and the 
later years. According to Akarlı, although Mount Lebanon was an autonomous territory, 
the Porte continued to consider the Mountain still as a quasi-regular Ottoman territory, 
and its governor as an ordinary Ottoman bureaucrat
223
.As it was mentioned earlier, at 
the beginning Davud Pasha was quite cautious about acting as a representative of the 
central authority but later on, once he became deeply involved in the politics of Mount 
Lebanon, he gradually began to act in terms of new ambitions hitherto non-existent. He 
began to see himself as the “head of a project for the creation of a politically, 
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administratively and economically model autonomous enclave within the Ottoman 
state
224
.  
After the end of Davud Pasha‟s term, Ali Pasha who was the grand vizier of the 
time, appointed in 1868 Franko Nasri Kusa Pasha. This new administrator was 
originally from Aleppo
225
. In contrast to Davud Pasha, who gained an ambitious 
character towards the end of his mission as mutasarrif, Franko Pasha remained 
completely loyal to the directives of the center and he avoided direct talks with the 
representatives of European powers. Instead of negotiating with the representatives of 
the great powers, he maintained cordial relationship with them and he also underlined 
that, since he is a governor appointed by the Porte and taking his orders from the center, 
the policy-oriented requests of the European Powers should be communicated through 
their ambassadors to the Porte
226
. During the governorship of Franko Pasha, good 
relationships between Istanbul and Deir al-Qamar did develop and this made the 
authority and sovereignty of Ottoman Empire more visible within the territories of 
Mount Lebanon
227
. 
Rüstem Pasha was the third governor of Mount Lebanon between the years of 
1873 and 1883. His full name was Rustem Mariani and he was an Italian in origin.This 
was also one of the troubled times of the Ottoman Empire both in internally and 
externally. When we look at the previous bureaucratic career of Rüstem Pasha, it was 
practically the same as his predecessors. Rüstem Pasha had previously served as an 
Ottoman ambassador to Florence and to St. Petersbourg. So, like the previous 
mutasarrifs, he was a sophisticated and well-educated person and this made him 
suitable for such an important mission. From the beginning of his administration in 
Mount Lebanon, Rüstem Pasha made it clear that the best interests of the people of 
Mount Lebanon lay in the hands of its people and their willingness to work together 
with the mutasarrifiyat administration. As a byproduct of this political perspective of 
Rüstem Pasha, he established cordial but equidistant and formal relations with all basic 
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groups and institutions which were wielding influence in the Mountain, including the 
Maronite Church and French Consulate
228
. According to Ahmed Hamdi Pasha, the then 
governor of Syria, even though Rüstem Pasha was the ideal governor for Mount 
Lebanon, the determined position of France due to his distance in bilateral relations 
would preclude his reappointment as mutasarrif. What the French state was looking for 
was a governor whom they could induce to allow them to become directly involved in 
the administration of Mount Lebanon as a prelude to the realization of their ambitions 
concerning Syria
229
. 
Vasa Pasha was the fourth governor of Mount Lebanon between the years of 1883 
and 1892. He was Albanian in origin. In essence, Vasa Pasha came to the office 
independent from the interventions of the French Consul General of Beirut, 
Patrimonio
230
 but as a result of his successful political campaign against Rüstem. At the 
beginning of his mission Patrimonio established friendly relations with Vasa Pasha. 
Vasa Pasha was impressed by this positive attempt that came from Beirut, but he did not 
realize their demands about replacement of the administrative officers who were 
appointed by his predecessor, Rüstem Pasha. In response to the non-obedient attitude of 
Vasa Pasha, Patrimonio wanted to teach him a lesson and toured the Mountain 
pompously in virtual defiance of Ottoman sovereignty
231
. Even though Vasa Pasha 
seemed unimpressed from the actions of Patrimonio, in reality he was rather disturbed 
and turned to Ahmed Hamdi Pasha for his advice. Ahmed Hamdi Pasha talked about all 
the complex internal struggles and relations in Mount Lebanon and in addition to this he 
also warned him about the intrigues of the French Consulate and the Maronite clergy
232
.  
It is possible to say that Vasa Pasha, as much as Davud Pasha, worked hard and 
did his best to realize the centralisation policies of the Porte in the Mountain. In an 
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official document from 1301/1883 and related to justice in Mount Lebanon, it has been 
claimed that the problems between the central authority (hükümet-i merkeziyye), the 
Maruni Taifesi and the population (ahali) could been able to be solved since the justice 
of the central government succeed in reaching to the every single group and every 
single person in the Mountain, even to the poor (fukara) and destitute (acize)
233
. In 
addition to justice issue, with the era of Vasa Pasha, people of Mount Lebanon also had 
a chance to travel safely and also busy themselves with their work in peace without 
worries in their minds concerning their lives, rights and property
234
. As it had been in 
the era of Davud Pasha, Vasa Pasha also continued the policy of providing schools, 
roads and other opportunities to assist the people of the Mountain to become more 
“civilized”.  
We know from at least one document that the central government and Vasa Pasha 
took steps to figure out the option of the population of the Mountain about the existing 
mutasarrifiyat system.  Accordingly, a committee consisting of governmental officials 
was sent to the kazas of Mount Lebanon including Metn, Kesrewan, Cezn, Şuk and 
Küre. People of these kazas were asked about their ideas on the local government. This 
general survey and investigation reached the result, according to the document, that 
people of these districts were quite happy about the mutasarrifiyat administration that 
ruled them in the name of the Ottoman sultan
235
. Even as it can be seen in this simple 
example, Vasa Pasha was working in order to fulfill the Sultan‟s decrees and 
instructions. Vasa Pasha believed that, if he could succeed in realizing the wishes of the 
Sultan, he would reinforce the respect toward Ottoman rule in Mount Lebanon and 
could make the certain groups of the Mountain forget about their searches for to solicit 
foreign support in pursuance of selfish interests
236
. Once the circumstances that divide 
the society into mutually hostile different section would disappear, Mount Lebanon 
would naturally become a more united region and perhaps a more integral part of the 
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Ottoman state. Just to summarize, it can be claimed that, as Engin Akarlı also indicated 
in his study, Vasa Pasha was convinced that with good administration, material progress 
and implementation of justice, the Lebanese could be integrated into the Ottomanist 
policies of the center and could start to define themselves as Ottoman citizens, rather 
than as a Maronite, Druze, Christian or Muslim
237
. 
Vasa Pasha‟s attitude clearly shows us that, the policy of Ottomanism cannot be 
thought separately from the centralist policies of Ottoman Empire. However, would it 
be possible to say that successes of the local governors such as Vasa Pasha could really 
provide the acceptance of an “Ottoman” common identity in place of their sectarian 
identities? Until now, we could only see the centralisation and Ottomanism policies 
from eyes and practices of local governors. However, it is also important to ask that 
what kind of a process the people of Mount Lebanon were going through? How did they 
define themselves? In addition to this, it is also important and crucial to look at the 
definition of Ottomanism. Is it possible to talk about only one definition of the 
Ottomanism? These are the basic questions that should be examine and tried to be 
answered in order to have a clear idea about the identity and ideological transformation 
in Mount Lebanon. 
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5. CHAPTER FOUR 
REACTIONS TO THE CENTRALIST POLICIES: OTTOMANISM VERSUS 
LEBANONISM 
5.1. The Emergence and Development of Ottomanism 
The Ottomanism was an ideology which came into existence at the beginning of 
the 19
th
 century and continued to exist as a quite decisive ideology until the final decade 
of Ottoman imperial existence. However, it went through certain transformations related 
to the changes in the political circumstances of the Ottoman Empire. 
Before discussing and examining the definition of Ottomanism, it is important to 
understand the political conjecture of the 19
th
 Century of Ottoman Empire, the era 
which was also defined as the “Long Century”238. As Ohannes Kılıçdağı argues in his 
article, at the beginning of the 19
th
 century Sublime Porte had certain concerns about the 
future of the Empire and about the probability of its collapse. The traditional Millet 
System which meant the division of Ottoman subjects according to their religious 
identities into administrative units was not effective for administering the subjects of 
Ottoman Empire anymore. The main reason for this situation was the spread of the ideas 
of liberty, individualism, secularism and rationalism which first emerged in Western 
Europe and the USA and subsequently began to spread within the Ottoman lands, 
especially among the non-Muslim population
239
. The reason as to why these ideas 
expanded among some segments of the non-Muslim population at first was to a major 
extent related to the higher level of interaction of some of the non-Muslims with 
Western Europeans and Americans in comparison to the Ottoman Muslims. 
Commercial contacts constituted one early means for the expansion of new ideas. The 
foundation of missionary schools provided an institutional framework for the 
dissemination of European and American knowledge. Since Muslim children did not 
have the opportunity to become students of these schools, they could not have the 
opportunity be familiar with those new ideas as much as a non-Muslim Ottoman child 
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could. Also, wealthy non-Muslim families preferred to send their children to abroad for 
higher education generally France, Northern Italy and Britain, which constituted another 
opportunity of interaction for non-Muslim children with the Western world. In the case 
of Young Ottomans, many upper- class Muslim families of the Ottoman Empire 
preferred to send their children to the Ottoman schools which provide both rational and 
modern education by covering variety of subjects. This modern education also 
transformed the ideological standpoint of Muslim Ottomans, but this was quite different 
than the way of it happened to the upper-class non-Muslim ones. 
Non-Muslim children who enjoyed a western-style of education began to question 
the position of religious leaders and their huge impact on the community life; they 
increasingly began to demand to be a part of the political decision process within their 
respective communities and did not want to live under the absolute political authority of 
their religious leaders
240
. All these circumstances combined, when the traditional way of 
the political administration gradually began to be shakened, the reformist bureaucrats of 
the Sublime Porte promoted Ottomanism as a part of the reform movement which aimed 
to contain and channel this unrest toward a framework of imperial political 
integration
241
. 
In this context, it is a quite crucial issue of how to define this new ideology of the 
19
th
 century Ottoman Empire? First of all, it is not possible talk about the idea of 
Ottomanism as a homogenous ideology. Related to internal and external political and 
social developments, Ottomanism also underwent through certain changes and 
evolutions. So, in this point it is useful to discuss Ottomanism by using a methodology 
that divides it into certain time periods. According to the methodology of Akşin Somel, 
we can talk about four different eras of the Ottomanism between the years of 1839 and 
1913. The first stage of the Ottomanism was in harmony with the centralising and 
autocratic policies of the Sublime Port and corresponds to the time interval of 1830-
1875. The second stage or interpretation of Ottomanism emerged between the years of 
1868 and 1878 through Young Ottoman Movement which developed as a reaction to the 
autocratic policies of the late Tanzimat statesmen. Third stage corresponds to the era of 
Sultan Abdülhamid II and Ottomanism becomes the ideology of Young Turk movement 
                                                          
240
 Ibid.25 
241
 Ibid.25. 
70 
 
which opposed to the despotic politics of Abdülhamid II. And the last stage is the idea 
of Ottomanism during the second constitutional era which demanded decentralization of 
the Empire
242
. In the context of this study, first two stages of the Ottomanism will be 
those approaches that will be focused on. 
According to the idea of Ottomanism of Tanzimat reformers, the Sultan is a father 
figure who stands in the center as a patriarchal authority, and the totality of the subjects 
of the Ottoman Empire (tebaa) is pictured as the equal children of the Sultan. The 
Ottoman Sultan is a patriarchal figure who loves all of his children with an 
unconditional love.
243
 The era of Tanzimat was also the time period when the Ottoman 
bureaucrat reached to the peak point of its political authority. To this version of the 
Ottomanism, the words of Sultan Mahmud II who could be considered as the first 
implementers of this policy can be a good example: “I realize among my subjects the 
Muslim ones within the mosque, the Christian ones within the church, and the Jewish 
ones within the synagogue. There is no other difference between them. My [feeling of] 
affection and equity for all of them is firm”244. 
As stated above, the Ottoman bureaucracy represented by the Sublime Porte, was 
the carrier of this centralist ideology to the peripheral regions of the Empire. The 
mission of Foreign Minister Fuad Pasha in Mount Lebanon after the 1858 Civil War, as 
will be seen below, is a good indicator of this mission. According to Fuad Pasha, who 
came to the Mountain in order to punish those culprits responsible from the violence, 
the reason of the massacre was the ancient (kadim) mutual hatred of two sects, Druzes 
and Maronites. From this perspective it was only Ottomanism, being a part of the 
Tanzimat reforms had the ability to put an end this hatred because of its centralizing 
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aspect that promises equal treatment to the every subject of Ottoman Empire
245
. As 
Ussama Makdisi indicates, what happened in Mount Lebanon after the year of 1860 was 
a “pek eski bir şey” which means “a very old thing”246.  
The task of Fuad Pasha in this mission was to oblige the people of Mount 
Lebanon to recognize the existence of the Sultan‟s authority. This involved firstly; equal 
treatment of every subject regardless of their sects or religious belief, and secondly his 
ability to punish without mercy those individuals or groups who stood against the 
reforms that he imposed on the people of periphery. In his speech before he left Mount 
Lebanon for his return to Istanbul, Fuad Pasha shows this aspect of the earlier 
understanding of Ottomanism: 
“... In return, all people should act in accordance with the Sultan‟s benevolent 
wishes, and each class of the imperial subjects should embrace tightly the principles of 
unity, patriotism and service to the nation by obeying imperial orders and by zealously 
fulfilling humanitarian obligations. [The Ottoman authorities are] authorized to carry 
out swift and strict punishment of any individual or group who dares oppose the 
imperial will”247. 
This authoritarian and centralist notion of Tanzimat Ottomanism, led to the 
emergence of the Young Ottoman reaction, resulting as a consequence in the emergence 
of a new approach toward the idea of Ottomanism. This first attempt of creating an 
organized opposition to the Sublime Porte articulated itself in the emergence of a secret 
committee known as the “Patriotic Pact” (İttifak-ı Hamiyyet). In the summer of 1865, 
six Ottoman intellectuals came together for a picnic at the Belgrad Forest; the main 
concern that brought these young people together was the possibility of the collapse of 
the Ottoman Empire in the near future.
248
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When we look at the educational background and their profession of these people, 
it strikes that almost all of them worked at the Translation Office of the Sublime Porte 
(Bab-ı Ali Tercüme Odası) for a while and for this reason they were knowledgeable 
about the way of international policy making of the Sublime Porte and also about the 
political systems which were existing then in Europe for a while. Those young Ottoman 
intellectuals who attended to that meeting decided to form a committee which would 
struggle for converting the existing absolutistic regime governance to a constitutional 
monarchy
249
. 
Among the members of this committee, there were important names of the Young 
Ottoman community such as Namık Kemal and Ziya Bey. As the main figures of the 
İttifak-ı Hamiyyet left the country for Paris, the way for the foundation of the Young 
Ottoman community was opened. In the year of 1867, Namık Kemal, Ziya Bey, Ali 
Suavi, Mehmed Bey, Reşad Bey and Rıfat Bey came together in the Parisian mansion of 
Mustafa Fazıl Pasha, their financial supporter and benefactor. As a result of this 
meeting, the Young Ottoman Party (Yeni Osmanlılar Cemiyeti) was founded and 
became an important actor of the Ottoman political history
250
. 
As already mentioned above, Mustafa Fazıl Pasha, in addition to his political 
contributions, was also supporting the Young Ottomans financially. He was one of the 
sons of the governor of Egypt Kavalalı İbrahim Pasha who was talked about previously 
in context of his governing position in Mount Lebanon and Syria. Mustafa Fazıl Pasha 
came to Istanbul in 1845 and began to work at the Secretarial Bureau of the Grand 
Vezirate (Sadaret Mektubi Kalemi). In the year of 1851, he joined to the High Council 
of the   (Meclis-i Ali-i Tanzimat) as a vizier
251
 
When we look at the political ideas of Mustafa Fazıl Pasha, it is possible to assert 
that he was supporter of a constitutional monarchy system. In a letter which he wrote to 
Sultan Abdülaziz, he supported the necessity of a constitution which would provide the 
equality and harmony between the Muslim and non-Muslim subjects of the Ottoman 
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Empire. According to Mustafa Fazıl Pasha this constitution would also provide a moral 
superiority towards the European rivals of the Ottoman Empire
252
. However, it is also 
conspicuous that the same person who supported the establishment of harmony and 
unity among the subjects of the Ottoman Empire, on the other hand indicated the 
existence of divine sentiments in the Turkish race (“Türk ırkında yaratılışından gelen 
ulvi duygular”) which is coming from its creation253. Although he emphasized the 
importance and indirectly the superiority of the Turkish race compared to the other 
ethnicities that were living in Ottoman territories, it is not possible to describe the 
Young Ottoman movement in general as a political reaction founded on a racist base. 
The Islamic tone was quite obvious in their writings; they were in fact Muslim 
intellectuals who had concerns for keeping the subjects of Ottoman Empire together. 
Even though they implied the importance of being Turkish subjects of the Sublime 
Porte, this did not lead them to design an administrative and political structure which 
would exclude other ethnic and religious groups. 
The emphasis on the love of the fatherland (vatan) was distinctly apparent in the 
Ottomanism of Young Ottoman movement. Especially when we look at Namık Kemal, 
we see his strong emphasis on the importance of protecting the fatherland. Similar to 
Mustafa Fazıl Pasha, Namık Kemal was also originating from a bureaucrat and elite 
family. Kemal was born in Tekirdağ in 1840. He was educated at Bayezid and Valide 
Rüşdiyes and these schools were the examples of the ones that were founded in the 
Tanzimat era and they were providing modern education to their students. Being an 
orphan, he spent an important part of his youth together with his grandfather Abdüllatif 
Pasha, who was a governor, in the provinces. Around 1857-1858, when Namık Kemal 
was seventeen years old, he came to Istanbul and began to work first at the Translation 
Office of the Customs (Gümrükler Tercüme Odası) and later at the Bab-ı Ali Tercüme 
Odası254.  
In order to identify the ideological perspective of Namık Kemal, his articles which 
were published at Hürriyet (“Liberty”) can serve as sound reference points. At the 
                                                          
252
 Şerif Mardin, “Yeni Osmanlı Düşüncesinin Doğuşu”, (Istanbul: İletişim, 
2008), p. 314. 
253
 Ibid. 313 
254
 Ibid.316-317. 
74 
 
beginning of one of his articles, which was titled as “Hubb-ul Watan min el-İman” 
(“The Love for Fatherland Emanates from Belief”), Namık Kemal states that 
“Everybody‟s fatherland is the abode of the society which s/he belongs”255. In this 
context, it is possible to say that the concept of vatan or fatherland was of a high 
significance since it was considered as a kind of home for the people. In the rest of the 
article, Namık Kemal asserts that people should sacrifice their lives in order to protect 
it. This understanding of vatan that we see in Namık Kemal would be used by the future 
Kemalist cadres. 
As it was mentioned earlier, Namık Kemal was the representative of the Islamic 
tone in the Young Ottoman movement. However, it is still possible to see some 
references in his writings concerning the importance of being of Turkish origin. For 
instance, again from the same article, we see the following line: 
 “If the bones of our ancestors who gave their lifes for the sake the fatherland 
were excavated… each field would be filled by numerous pyramids and perhaps by 
fortifications which could protect all our sides from enemy attacks.”256. 
Kemal wrote these lines to remember those Ottomans who did not hesitate to fight 
for their fatherland and to commemorate the huge number of martys in the past who 
fought for this sacred cause. The crucial point in this line is that, even though it is not 
possible to talk about a direct reference to Turkish subjects, when he uses a term such as 
“ecdadımız” which means our ancestors, it is quite obvious that he does not talk about 
the non-Muslim subjects of the Ottoman Empire. It might refer to Muslim subjects as a 
whole, however the nature of the relations of the Arabic community with the center of 
the Empire and also Namık Kemal‟s emphasis on the importance of fatherland, leads us 
to think that his reference was probably to the Muslim-Turkish community. 
In Hürriyet, it is in fact possible to see an article that discusses the issues related 
to the Civil War of 1858 in Mount Lebanon. For our purposes this article is significant 
since it reveals us the perspective of the Young Ottoman community over the problem. 
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In the second issue of this newspaper, the article discusses the issue of mutual fear and 
hatred existing between the different sects of the Empire. The article claims that, 
existence of fear in an Empire which brings together so many ethnicities (yetmiş iki 
millet) is simply not right and logical
257
. 
When it comes to the issue of the 1858 Civil War in Mount Lebanon, the article 
argues that: 
“The privileges previously bestowed by the Sublime Porte to Mount subjected the 
Maronites to greed. A series of provocations from abroad was included to this. The 
Maronites tried to remove the Druzes from the Mountain. But the Druzes snatched their 
arms and resisted them.”258 
According to the Young Ottoman perspective, the Ottoman bureaucracy was the 
one to blame about the violence that happened in Mount Lebanon between two sects of 
the region. What also strikes is that the Young Ottomans, rather than questioning the 
Druze side of the conflict, prefer to depict an image which shows Druzes as the 
innocent people who defended themselves against the avaricious Maronites. According 
to the Young Ottomans, the privileges provided to the non-Muslim community of 
peripheral regions such as Damascus and Mount Lebanon caused the emergence of this 
bloody conflict. This point shows us that even though the Young Ottoman idea of 
Ottomanism tried to create a common Ottoman identity which includes both Muslim 
and non-Muslim subjects of the Porte, it could not be possible because of the apparent 
Islamic discourse in their ideological background. 
Ali Suavi was one of the members of Young Ottoman movements who supported 
intensely the existence of an Islamic dimension within the idea of Ottomanism of the 
community. For this reason he conflicted with other members of the community and 
finally separated his way from the Young Ottomans.  Different from the other members 
of Young Ottoman community, Ali Suavi was coming from a poor family and he was 
not educated in the Tanzimat era schools but he studied at medreses and mosques. 
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Especially the difference of his ideological background appears to have formed the 
source his ideological differentiation from the other members of the Young Ottoman 
community. He worked as a teacher at various medreses and rüşdiyes and at the same 
time he worked as a bureaucrat for a while
259
.  
Ali Suavi was against the attempt of Namık Kemal to put the concept of 
“sovereignty of people” into the Islamic literature. In his article called “al-Hakimu 
Huvallah” which was published in Muhbir, a newspaper published by himself, Ali 
Suavi argues that: 
“There is now an assertion which has gained fame: They say „popular 
sovereignty‟. This assertion is a translation from French… This word is thought to be 
originally from the Latin term „soprenos‟, which means someone who does what he 
wants to do, who has power through his own personality, who is an independent 
authority. Very well, then who is the person who rules by himself and imposes his 
perfect power over everything existing? There is no one with such a qualification except 
for God Almighty who has a souverainéte”260. 
As it can be seen, Ali Suavi was not supporting the liberal interpretation of 
Ottomanism and he did not wanted to see the creation of a synthesis between Islamist 
and Liberal ideas. According to one of his articles which was published at Muhbir, he 
also objected the use of common courts by Muslim and non-Muslim subjects of the 
Empire
261
. 
In order to summarize the discussions on Ottomanism, the Young Ottoman 
interpretation of this ideology constituted the ideological structure to oppose the 
centralist and authoritarian regime of the Ottoman bureaucracy during the Tanzimat era. 
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Its difference from the future Ottomanist ideas was that the earlier idea of Ottomanism 
was established on a cultural ground. The aim of both Ottoman bureaucrat and Young 
Ottoman movement was the creation of a kind of a citizenship that gives equal right and 
duties to every single person living in the territory of the Empire, regardless of his 
ethnic and religious identity. In essence, the Ottomanism of the earlier era was not 
trying to define a nation, because there was still a hope for keeping those different sects 
together and saving the Empire from its future collapse. As it will be discussed in 
context of Arabism, the result was not what Muslim-elite intellectuals of the Ottoman 
center though to be in the peripheral regions of the Empire.   
5.2. The Era of Abdülhamid and Ideological Transformation 
The coup of May 1876 and the deposition of Abdülaziz in favour of Murad V was 
a favorable development for the supporters of the Young Ottoman movement. In the 
same year the first constitution of the Ottoman Empire, the Kanun-i Esasi was declared. 
This constitution is noteworthy in terms of defining Ottoman citizenship for the first 
time in legal terms. According to the eight article of Kanun-i Esasi, being an Ottoman 
was defined as follows: 
“The totality of those individuals who are the subjects of the Ottoman State are 
designated, irrespective of their religion and sect, [and] without exception, as 
Ottomans”262. 
As it can be seen, the subjects of Ottoman Empire were considered, without any 
discrimination based on sect or religion, as Ottomans. We know that Young Ottomans 
like Namık Kemal and Ziya Bey were among the team which formulated the draft text 
of the constitution. Thus Young Ottomans attained their basic aim with the declaration 
of this very important document and it was an important attempt to realize Ottomanism 
as a citizenship. However, the experiment of the First Constitutional era came to an end 
with the autocratic rule of Abdulhamid II. 
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The era of Abdülhamid began simultaneously with certain crucial political 
developments, which affected both the Porte‟s internal policy and the ideological 
perspective of Sultan Abdülhamid. He was enthroned on 31 August 1876 after the 
deposition of his elder brother Murad V due to mental health problems
263
. When we 
look at the political conjecture of the period of Abdulhamid II‟s accession, the war with 
Serbia, the political challenge of Midhat Pasha to his rule, the international conference 
in Istanbul on the Balkan crisis, the opening of the first Ottoman parliament as well the 
disastrous Russo-Ottoman War altogether strengthened the young sultan‟s perception of 
external threats.  These issues, combined with problems existing within the palace itself 
had certain effects on Abdulhamid‟s personal characteristics. In words of Georgeon, he 
was a complex and in some ways contradictory character and his most obvious feature 
was a morbid strain of insecurity and suspicious-mindedness which under pressure 
tended to express itself in persecutory ideas
264
. 
In the era of Abdülhamid, the liberal Ottomanist ideas of the Young Ottoman 
movement with some Islamic tones lost their validity at the level of the government; the 
Hamidian state gradually shifted directly to the Islamist policies. From Yasemee‟s point 
of view, since we do not have so much information about Abdulhamid‟s religious 
belief, it is better to take his Islamist policies under the context of his conservatism. 
What it means is that, conservatism and Islamism served to his concern to stabilize the 
state by governing in accordance with the nature and characteristics of his subjects
265
. 
He was willing to keep the order and both in the centre and in the Arabic lands; 
Islamism was ideological glue that was assumed to be effective in keeping together the 
Muslim population. He was not only caring about the Muslim population under his own 
rule; he also thought that an Islamist perspective in foreign policy could be used as a 
threat against the British Empire in its colonies which included huge Muslim 
populations like India.  
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In his personal terms, Abdulhamid was not in favor of a decentralised system. He 
conceded that decentralised administration might work in other states, but insisted that it 
would produce disastrous results for the Ottoman Empire
266
. The main reason behind 
his this way of thinking was that, due to the multi-ethnic and multi-religious 
composition of the Empire, any attempts that would open the way for a decentralised 
administration would give a good chance to Great Powers to intervene in internal 
politics of the Ottoman state and this inevitably would cause to the disintegration and 
eventually to the total collapse of the Empire. Because of such concerns for keeping the 
territorial integrity of the Empire, Abdulhamid turned into an autocratic ruler in a very 
harsh sense, especially in terms of internal politics and his rule in peripheral regions. It 
is possible to say that autocracy as a means of governance at the central level as well as 
within peripheral regions became his guiding principle. 
Even though Abdulhamid II considered Islamism as an important device to be 
implemented for keeping together the Muslim subjects of the Empire, the issue of what 
he did to achieve his aim is a substantial question that is open to discussion. While 
Abdulhamid II was trying to rule the Empire by applying autocratic methods together 
with a high level of Islamic tone, in Arab lands, in Syria and Lebanon in particular, the 
byproduct of centralizing policies lasting since 1840s and effects of the Western ideas 
created its own dynamics, which will be discussed below. 
5.3. Lebanonism and Its Relation with the Idea of Ottomanism 
The development of Lebanonism as a nationalist idea in the region of Mount 
Lebanon cannot be comprehended without looking at the issue of Arabism from a wider 
perspective. This would enable us to understand the dynamics of this relatively local 
ideology. 
There are still academically ongoing debates about the issue of Arabism, such as 
the time of its emergence, about the definition of this movement, and whether it was a 
reaction to the idea and policy of Ottomanism being imposed by the center of Empire. 
As it has been discussed in the previous chapter, Arabism and specifically Lebanonism 
should not be considered only as a nationalist movement, it was also an alternative 
attempt to define citizenship.  
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The primary question to ask about Arabism is when it actually began. According 
to Hourani, it can be pursued back to seventeenth century, when the Ottoman Empire 
began to have problems with its central authority over the peripheral regions. Although 
during the seventeenth century, the Sublime Porte kept its control over its European 
provinces, semi-autonomous ruling groups began to emerge in Asia Minor, the Middle 
East and North Africa, as have been discussed in the first chapter when dealing with 
Sidon and Cairo
267
. When it comes to the case of Lebanon, local families were in 
control especially of internal politics. However, it is important to indicate that, 
development of these local power centers during the seventeenth century was affecting 
the Ottoman Empire‟s political structure but these local powers did not constitute a huge 
threat for the Empire‟s existence in the short run268. 
Within the context of the discussions about the idea of Arabism, it is important to 
mention about the role of Ottoman Arabs in the administrational level. The discussion 
about the millet system which means the division of Ottoman subjects according to their 
religious identities into administrative units always claims the existing discrimination 
against the non-Muslim people. However, despite its Islamic character, Ottoman center 
was probably not very inclusive to its Arabic subjects either. For instance, according to 
the data provided by Hasan Kayalı, during the whole Ottoman history, there have been 
only few subjects of Arab origin who succeeded in rising to upper administrative 
positions. We see the continuation of this situation also during the Tanzimat era
269
. 
According to Danişmend, among 215 Ottoman grand viziers none was definitely known 
to be of Arabic ethnic origin and only three of them might be possibly suspected to have 
been Arabs
270
. Only this rather specific example is indicative to the position of the 
center toward the Arabic subjects of the peripheral regions despite the common 
religious identity. 
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The repercussions of the Ottomanist ideas and policies of the Tanzimat on the 
Arab periphery are important to be recognized. As it has been mentioned previously, the 
Tanzimat period created its own bureaucratic elites who were well aware of their own 
interests and becoming more independent from the centre in time. Also the legal 
equality discourse which was created by the center caused certain problems among the 
Muslim population, specifically among the Arabs. Although Arab subjects of the 
Empire were excluded from the central administration and they could not have a chance 
to be a part of the new-born bureaucratic elites, in social contexts they had certain 
superiorities over the non-Muslim population as a part of the millet system. However, 
the legal equality understanding came together with the Tanzimat, abolished those 
social privileges of Muslim population and this created some sort of a reaction to the 
new centralization policies of the Ottoman bureaucracy
271
. 
Looking at Syria, the emergence and expansion of the nationalist sentiments did 
not happen evenly if Muslim and non-Muslim Arabs are compared. The idea of 
Arabism spread rather slowly among the Muslim Arabs although the great families of 
Syria could not take a direct share in the central government of Ottoman Empire
272
. 
However, when it comes to Christian Arabs, the situation was quite different. As 
Hourani indicates in his study, the educated sections of the Christian population of Syria 
and also of Mount Lebanon had always been in interaction with newly developing 
political ideas in Europe. In case of Mount Lebanon, one of the primary means that 
provided this interaction was the Missionary schools in the region. Here, since earlier 
eras it was possible to witness the establishment of numerous schools, especially 
belonging to Jesuit Missions. During the reign of Abdulhamid, the policy of France to 
establish new schools in Mount Lebanon became a source of serious concern for the 
Sublime Porte; Ottoman authorities tried to find effective means to prevent the 
influence of France especially over the Maronite community of the Mountain
273
. In 
addition to employing policies aiming to prevent the establishment of new missionary 
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schools, another measure included the creation of conditions which would curtail the 
influence of the already existing foreign schools. In one of the documents, from the 
Yıldız Esas Evrak Fonds, it is possible to see that the Director of Education of Beirut, 
requested from the Sublime Porte the establishment of a new government lycée (Sultani 
Mektebi) and a printing press; the aim was to prevent the influence of Jesuit schools and 
other missionary organizations located in Beirut and in Mount Lebanon
274
.An 
alternative to the prevailing problem of foreign educational influence was the idea of 
admitting children from Mount Lebanon to the Mekteb-i Sultani of Beirut. This 
government lycée founded around 1881. From another correspondence located in the 
Yıldız Esas Evrak Fonds, we acquire the information that due to budgetary problems, it 
was not possible to establish new schools in Mount Lebanon; an alternative solution to 
prevent children to be educated in the “ecnebi” schools; was to accept them to the 
Mekteb-i Sultani
275
.  
Despite all these attempts of the Sublime Porte to promote Ottomanism, Arabism 
developed as an independent idea confronting Ottomanism. However, this does not 
mean that every Arab intellectual who was deeply aware of his/her ethnic identity was 
categorically against the discourse of Ottomanism. The case of Butrus el-Bustani is an 
important example for an Arab intellectual supporting Arabism as an ideology with the 
attempt of combining it with the Ottomanism. Before going into details of Bustani‟s 
ideological standpoint, it is helpful to talk about his biography briefly in order to 
understand his discourse. Butrus al-Bustani was born into a Maronite family in Mount 
Lebanon in 1819 and he graduated from the Patriarchal School in Ayn Waraqa. This 
school in Ayn Waraqa at that time was possibly one of the best modern educational 
institutions in Syria for that time. This college was teaching Arabic, Latin, Syrian and 
Italian in addition to religious knowledge
276
. This kind of an educational background 
probably influenced a lot his political ideas. In 1840, Butrus al-Bustani came to Beirut 
and he was employed as a dragoman for the command of the British forces dispatched 
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to help the Ottomans in evicting İbrahim Pasha from Syria277. Later, he began to work 
as a teacher for a school of Protestant American Missions. In the same year, he left his 
Maronite faith and became Protestant
278
. 
The events of 1858 became a breaking point for the ideological transformation of 
Butrus al-Bustani. The 1858 Civil War became a crucial development in the context of 
the Eastern Question. Bustani was supporting that 1860 represented the alternative to 
the European-centered modernity understanding and this was a point of view which was 
similar with Fuad Pasha
279
.However, their way of thinking was different about the 
lessons that should be drawned from the sectarian strife of 1858. According to Fuad 
Pasha, the violence of 1858 reflected the existence of sectarian strife which Ottoman 
Empire should prevent through disciplinary measures. Fuad Pasha also claimed that, 
this sectarian division had an ancient characteristic, reflecting the feudal and uncivilized 
aspect of the society inhabiting in Mount Lebanon. For this reason, reforms and 
modernization of the center was a crucial necessity and that would only be possible with 
the imposition of certain reforms from the center. That is the reason why, despite the 
claims of the Sublime Porte‟s Ottomanist idea‟s about creation of a common identity, it 
inevitably had a centralizing and imperial characteristics in its nature
280
. On the other 
hand, it should be indicated that despite his criticism towards the reform movement 
perspective of the Sublime Porte, Butrus al-Bustani was one of those Christian Arab 
intellectuals who thought that the interest and the future of his country lay in the 
stipulations of the 1856 Reform Edict which could be considered as an important step 
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toward integrating Ottoman Empire‟s communities into the social and political structure 
of the state and establishing the latter on a totally new basis
281
. 
Butrus al-Bustani was thinking rather different from Fuad Pasha about the idea of 
imposing reformist rules from the center to the periphery. Bustani did not conceive 
about the idea of reformation in terms of an imperial project which had to be imposed 
on a “backward” and “traditional” periphery. In words of Ussama Makdisi, “He 
[Bustani] saw modernization as a process that recuperated putatively local traditions of 
religious coexistence from the dangers of 1860, not as a process that introduced 
coexistence after 1860, as the Ottomans and European powers assumed”282. This means 
that Bustani analyzed the violence of 1860 as a significant distortion of the established 
norm of coexistence and considered it as a shocking but temporary madness of the 
Lebanese society
283
. In this perspective, Bustani created a historical image of a pre-1860 
era when both Maronite and Druze sects lived in a peaceful coexistence. Even though 
Butrus al-Bustani‟s perspective of a harmonious Lebanon is to some extent more 
plausible compared to Fuad Pasha‟s “ancient hatred” fiction, Bustani‟s image of a 
purely peaceful Mount Lebanon does not reflect the reality at all. As it has been 
discussed and examined earlier, the problems between the Druze and Maronite sects go 
back to the era of Egyptian invasion; in other words the Civil War of 1858-1860 was 
not an event which came out of the blue. 
Butrus al-Bustani was certainly not a proponent of the collapse of Ottoman 
Empire and he was also not completely against the ideology of Ottomanism. On the 
other hand, Butrus al-Bustani had his own notion of nationality. According to him, a 
nation consisted of people united by its jinsiyya (“kind”, “sort, “nationality”), like the 
French or Germans, who fulfilled the commonly accepted criteria for nationhood. This 
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criterion was living in one land and speaking one language
284
. However, he also located 
this definition of Syrian nation within an overarching Ottoman imperial framework. In 
words of Ussama Makdisi, it is possible to define Bustani as a Protestant-inclined, 
reformed Maronite Syrian subject who aspired to become a modern citizen
285
.  Butrus 
al-Bustani‟s educational background helped him to develop this secular idea of 
nationalism. In 1856 he began to publish the well-known newspaper named Nafir 
Suriyya (“Party of Syria”); the general theme in this newspaper was that the 
establishment of interaction between the center and periphery could be useful in the 
foundation of a modern state and also the understanding of the modern citizenship
286
. 
When we compare the degree of national awareness of Bustani with the members 
of Young Ottoman community, it can be claimed that Bustani was one step further 
compared to them. As it has been discussed earlier, Young Ottomans and also the 
Sublime Porte‟s idea of Ottomanism did not contain any dominant ethnic discourse. 
Although it is possible to see certain implication especially in the articles of Namık 
Kemal, it is not possible to say that Young Ottomans‟ ideology had a secular aspect. 
Rather than a secular understanding of the “nation”, they were indicating the importance 
of the Islam for the future of the Empire. Bustani was focusing on the importance of 
land and language for being described as a nation. For this reason, even though he was 
not in favor of the collapse of Ottoman Empire, he preferred to publish his newspaper 
Nafir Suriyya in Arabic. This shows us that, what he understands from the term of 
nation was not what the idea of Ottomanisn proposed to be. 
Bustani, was only one of the Arab and specifically Syrian intellectuals of the era 
who thought and discussed about the issues of identity and politics. There were different 
intellectual actors and organizations and the important point is that it is not possible to 
talk about existence of homogeneities among those actors. This means that, when we 
talk about “Arabism”, “Syrianism” or “Lebanonism”, they do not represent a 
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homogenous ideology. The same is applicable also for the Ottomanism as it has been 
discussed previously. Despite their exclusions from the upper administrative positions, 
the existence of the Ottoman Sultan as the “Caliphate of „Umma” diverged the Muslim 
Arabs from the Christian Arabs of the era. Somehow, Muslim Arabs continued to see 
the Islam as the factor that ties them to the central authority.  
The intellectuals of Syria and Mount Lebanon were not the only ones who 
involved in political activities and who experienced an ideological transformation. At 
the same time, when we look at the number of population in kazas of Mount Lebanon, 
we see that despite all the massacres of 1858, the heterogeneity of population continues 
to exist. For instance, in Şuk, there were 10035 Druzes and 7217 Maronites and in 
Cezin, there were 16 Druzes and 2953 Maronites
287
. Even though the era of 
Mutasarrifiyat regime provided a relative stable era, it was not possible to claim that it 
destroyed the political and social polarization among the two main sects of Mount 
Lebanon, Druzes and Maronites. In case of Maronites, their political activism was not 
only limited with Mount Lebanon, according to a document that belongs to the year of 
1893, a Maronite community which was called as Marmaron was founded in Beirut. 
The person who wrote this document to inform the center, asserts the founder bishop of 
the community raped to a women before he came to Beirut and the main motivation for 
him for establishing this kind of a community was “Şu cemiyetin maksad-ı asliyesi 
Marunniyyet kilise ve manastırlarının idaresine ve varidat ve masarafatına papa 
hazretlerinin müdahalesine mani etmekten ibaret idi”288. The document continues quite 
interesting and asserts that the leading bishop of Marmaron community went to French 
Consulate and asked for the protection of French government for his community. In 
return, he proposed them to educate children in schools just as it has been in the French 
curriculum (… mekteblerde tıpkı Fransız gibi terbiye ita‟ ederek…)289. Also as a 
promise to French government, when the Syria separates from Ottoman Empire and has 
its own independence, the bishop promises that they will not do see themselves separate 
from the French people, in other words the bishop promises the future friendship of two 
independent nations. 
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To summarize, after the 1858 Civil War, especially the Arab Christian 
intellectuals such as Butrus al-Bustani developed new ideas as becoming a nation who 
shares a common land (watan) and common language. Even the relative peaceful 
conditions provided by the Mutasarrifiyat regime could not prevent the establishment of 
political organizations which pursue separatist policies like Marmaron community. 
However, it is not possible to talk about the existence of a homogenous idea of 
Arabism, just like the Ottomanist ideology. 
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6. CONCLUSION 
The 1858 Civil War and the following Mutasarrifiyat regime created a breaking 
point in the history of Mount Lebanon and it can be claimed that its effects also 
continued to shape the political life of the Mountain during the years of the 
establishment of modern Lebanese state. 
First of all, the feudal system of Mount Lebanon which goes back to the era of 
Mamluk rule continued to exist after the Ottoman conquest in 1516. Under the 
conditions of the 16th century, Ottoman centre saw that preserving the existing feudal 
system in Syria and Mount Lebanon for its benefit and delegated their authority of 
collecting taxes in an organized manner and providing peace and security in these 
regions to the local rulers. Because of this continuity of the feudal system in the region, 
Mount Lebanon did not become totally depended on the Ottoman centre at the sixteenth 
century and the sultan was content with the acknowledgement of his authority by 
powerful local families. This attitude of the Ottoman centre towards the region gave 
Mount Lebanon quite autonomous characteristics compared to the other peripheral 
regions of the Empire and local families became quite effective in the administration of 
their towns or regions. Even though this existing balance between the centre and 
periphery was quite beneficial for the Ottoman state in the short term, it caused certain 
problems in the future, particularly during the nineteenth century. 
Deteriorations in the local feudal system of Mount Lebanon did not have only one 
reason. During the political transformation of the Mountain, it is a necessity to take into 
consideration the changes that were happening in the Ottoman Empire in general. It is 
important to note that, until 1920 Mount Lebanon was a part of the Ottoman territory 
and for this reason it is not possible to understand the political transformation of the 
Mountain in isolation from the developments in the Ottoman centre. When we look at 
the process of the emergence of problems in the political and social structure of Mount 
Lebanon in this perspective; one of the reasons that led to the emergence of these 
problems is the relative decentralization process which Ottoman Empire underwent 
during the 18
th
 century. This process had major effects on the periphery of Ottoman 
Empire. As a result of the military and economical changes in the post-16
th
 century era, 
particularly as a consequence of the demands of the new forms of warfare, Ottoman 
fiscal practices shifted dramatically. In the seventeenth century due to deterioration of 
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already existing fiscal problems, short term taxing which could be seen as a way of 
internal borrowing systems was in a state of crisis. For this reason, the Ottoman state 
was forced to introduce a new form of tax collection system named as Malikane-i 
Divani in 1695. This new system can be accepted as an economic privilege which was 
given to the local rulers. Because of this “economic privatization” process, eighteenth 
century of the Ottoman Empire has been defined as an era of decentralization. This 
paved the way for the strengthening of local rulers and in the 18
th
 century, the political 
and economic empowerment of local rulers led to the broke of the existing balance 
between the Sublime Porte and peripheral regions. Due to its already existing strong 
feudal characteristics, this transformation of the Empire in the 18
th
 century deteriorated 
the existing political and social balance in Mount Lebanon and this led to the emergence 
of political developments in the Mountain which increased the social tension between 
Maronite and Druze sects. 
The emergence Muhammad Ali as a strong local political figure in Egypt was a 
byproduct of this decentralization process of the 18
th
 century in the Ottoman Empire. 
Egyptian occupation in the Mountain which began in 1831 and lasted until 1840 
constituted the first break in the political structure of Mount Lebanon. Before I begin to 
the research about this study, one of my assumptions was that the break from the feudal 
past started to happen with the Double Qaimaqamate system in 1841 and reached to its 
peak point during the Mutasarrifiyat era. However, at the end of this study, one of the 
crucial conclusions that I have reached is that, the Egyptian occupation in Mount 
Lebanon depicted a clear, if not a radical departure from the past feudal structure of the 
Mountain and the existing social order in the region. In terms of the changes emerged in 
the political realm, emergence of a central administrative system in Mount Lebanon and 
generally in Syria region firstly began with the centralization policies of Ibrahim Pasha, 
as previously discussed in details. With the Egyptian occupation, it is important to note 
that Mount Lebanon became the peripheral region of the quite autonomous 
administration in Egypt. Until the end of the Egyptian interregnum in the Mountain, the 
central power over Mount Lebanon shifted from Sublime Porte to Egypt. When it 
comes to the changes in the social order, the support that provided by Maronite Sheikh 
Bashir Shihab to Egyptian regime provided a privileged position against the Druze 
subjects of the Mountain and the confiscated lands of the Druze people were given to 
Maronite notables. In this point, it is possible to claim that, the mutual hatred between 
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Maronite and Druze people did not immediately emerge before 1858; it was founded 
during the administration of Ibrahim Pasha in the Mountain. For this reason Druze 
peasants were the first to begin a revolt against Ibrahim Pasha‟s administration and later 
on due to the emerging discontent among Maronite locals for the confiscation of 
weapons and the attempt of the Egyptian ruler to establish a central army led Maronites 
to join Druzes. 
The establishment of the Double Qaimaqamate system and the beginning of the 
Tanzimat era could not soothe the existing tension between Maronite and Druze locals 
of Mount Lebanon. The Gülhane Rescript aimed to emphasize the existence of Sultan in 
the center who approaches equally to both his Muslim and non-Muslim subjects. 
However, the emphasis on the judicial equality between the subjects belonging to 
different sects negatively affected the already existing tensions between Maronites and 
Druzes stemming from the discriminative policies of Ibrahim Pasha. At the beginning, 
Ottoman centre was in an effort to rule the Mountain directly by appointing a governor 
however the internationalization of Mount Lebanon related with the existing of 
missionary schools, international support behind Maronites and Druzes radicalized the 
both sects and this led to the failure of the appointed governor Ömer Pasha.  
The Double Qaimaqamate system which proposed the division of Mount Lebanon 
into two distinct administrative regions; the northern district which was suppose to be a 
homogenous “Christian” area ruled by a Christian district governor and the southern 
part of the Mountain which was to be “distinctively” Druze region ruled by a Druze 
district governor could not be successful and could not prevent the emergence of the 
1858 Lebanese Civil War.  However, from the very beginning the Double Qiamaqamate 
system presented serious difficulties since it has been instituted on the false assumption 
that both the northern and southern districts of Mount Lebanon was consisted from 
homogenous societies. It was possible to see Druze villages in the Northern part under 
the Christian qaimaqam‟s administration. More crucially, the new qaimaqamate system 
could not meet the expectations of Druze subjects of the Empire. Due to their problems 
and sufferings during the ten-year reign of Ibrahim Pasha, Druzes were the one who 
started and provoked the revolt against Egyptian rule in the whole geography. Despite 
their attempts Druze sheikhs claimed that their feudal superiority over the Christians 
denied by the Ottoman state. The ongoing administrative problems during the Tanzimat 
and Double Qaimaqamate era caused the increase in the already existing social tension 
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between Maronite and Druze population of the Empire. The new system also could not 
be successful in abolishing the ongoing characteristics of the local feudal system in 
Mount Lebanon. Beyond that, the Double Qaimaqamate system that established by the 
Sublime Porte in the Mountain also deteriorated the gains of Ibrahim Pasha‟s 
centralization attempts and local powers started to be influential in the politics of the 
Mountain again. 
As we take into consideration all the developments emerged with the beginning of 
the Egyptian interregnum, Kisrawan revolt was only the end result of this long process 
and then turned into a catastrophic civil war in Mount Lebanon. The support of the 
Sublime Porte for the Druzes during the 1858 Civil War is also clearly indicated in the 
studies of the scholars such as Leila Fawaz. Even though it is not possible to ignore the 
casualties of the Druze side at the end of the war, the number of people who lost their 
lives during the war in the Maronite side was apparently higher. During the research for 
this study, I could not find a document that gives the exact data about the number of 
casualties from both sides, but according to the general information that I acquired from 
the memoirs of Colonel Churchill and about the other memoirs via the secondary 
sources, they all acknowledge the military superiority of the Druzes and massacres that 
applied to the Maronite people by Druzes. 
The era of Mutasarrifiyat began with the declaration of the Reglement Organique 
as a result of the consensus reached between European powers and the Ottoman Empire. 
It is important to note that despite the contribution of European Powers in the formation 
of the Mutasarrifiyat regime, the Mountain was still a part of the Ottoman territory and 
the Sublime Porte was the one in charge to appoint the mutasarrif to the region. 
According to another principle of the Reglement Organique the mutasarrif of Mount 
Lebanon was have to be an Ottoman bureaucrat. For this reason, it is a necessity to 
examine the mutasarrifyat regime within the context of the center-periphery relations. 
The mutasarrifiyat experience could not be understood by evaluating it separately from 
the centralist policies of the Sublime Porte. One of the most important point about the 
mutasarrifiyat regime is that it totally abolished the feudal structure of Mount Lebanon 
which succeeded to exist for long centuries. Since it was not possible to totally remove 
the powerful local families who were politically quite effective during the feudal era of 
the Mountain, the Sublime Porte tried to integrate local rulers into the new system by 
giving them important administrative missions.  
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The first four mutasarrifs of Mount Lebanon contributed a lot for providing the 
order and stability in the region. However, even though they remained loyal to the 
sublime Porte, this did not mean that they had no ambition to establish their local 
authority. This was quite obvious in the case of Davud Pasha. As it was discussed in 
details, although he did not lose his loyalty to the center, this did not prevent him to take 
his own decisions and also meet European representatives without the knowledge of the 
Sublime Porte. When we come to the reign of Abdulhamid II, despite his autocratic rule 
all over the Empire and the strict loyalty of the mutasarrifs in his era such as Vasa 
Pasha, this did not mean that those mutasarrifs also worked for establishing their 
personal authority. Despite these facts, the general conclusion we can reach about the 
first four mutasarrifs of Mount Lebanon is that, these successful bureaucrats of the 
Sublime Porte and who also had the experience in diplomacy, they acted as the good 
representatives of the Sublime Porte in the locality of Mount Lebanon.  
All these political developments had its reflections on the Lebanese society. Even 
though the emergence of the sectarianism and the increasing awareness of Lebanese 
people about their ethnic identity did not mean the emergence of a nationalist movement 
for the time being, it caused the politicization of people via their identities. For this 
reason Arabism and Lebanonism emerged as a response to the centralist arguments of 
Ottomanism. The political transformation in Mount Lebanon cannot be understood 
without looking at the ideological transformation. As I have mentioned previously, 
Lebanonist and Arabist ideologies emerged as a reaction to the Ottomanist ideology of 
the center but in addition to this, the experience of 1858 Civil War also caused the 
emergence of this ideological awakening. 
At the end of this study, it is noticed that it is not possible to describe Ottomanism 
as a monotype ideology. As it was discussed in details, Ottomanism had different claims 
and arguments in different eras. However, the centralization aspect remained as the core 
point of the Ottomanism during the Young Ottoman movement and Hamidian era  For 
this reason, Lebanonism and Arabism were the reflections of the politicization of 
people‟s ideologies in the Arabic periphery. As we can see in the Lebanonist intellectual 
Butrus al-Bustani, although in the nature he did not totally reject the Ottoman identity, 
he had his distance about the centralist aspect of this ideology. On the other side, the 
Ottomanist intellectuals of the center also failed to include the Christian Arabs of the 
Mountain in the common Ottoman identity that they established due to their high 
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emphasis on the Islam, particularly during the era of Young Ottomans and also the era 
of Abdulhamid II. 
About the Arabism and Lebanonism discussion, both terms are used 
interchangeably for the purpose of this study since the main aim of this paper was 
showing the separatist reaction of Mount Lebanon as a peripheral region. However, the 
result of the research on the subject proved that the existence of a problem about my 
hypothesis. At the end of my research, I have found out that although both Arabism and 
Lebanonism have certain relations with each other, they also had their own particular 
characteristics and the same as the Ottomanism, they do not constitute homogeneity 
within themselves. In addition to this, when we look at the Arabic intellectuals who 
were supporters of these ideologies during the Hamidian era, it is possible to see that 
not all of them support the separation from the Empire.  
This study tried to suggest an alternative perspective to the existing studies about 
the history of the 19
th
 century Ottoman Lebanon and it tried to show that it is not 
possible to understand dynamics of the region without taking into consideration the 
political and economic transformations in the Ottoman center. It also tried to 
demonstrate the existence of a relation between the ideological transformations both in 
the center and in the Mountain as one of the peripheral regions of the Empire. 
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